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ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE SANCTIONS AND
THE GATT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PELLY
AMENDMENT ON FOREIGN ENVIRONMENTAL
PRACTICES
Steve Charnovitz"
INTRODUCTION
One can question, from an environmental and legal perspective,
whether it is appropriate to use trade sanctions to achieve environmental
goals. Although countries have yet to impose sanctions for this purpose,
the United States has threatened such sanctions, engendering much con-
cem in the trade policy community. The U.S. Pelly Amendment (Pelly
or Pelly Amendment) is the most noted law of this type.' Because there
is considerable experience in the implementation of this law, this Article
will employ case studies to consider whether trade sanctions are appro-
priate.
Part I of this Article provides a conceptual framework for the role of
environmental trade measures in attaining international environmental
cooperation. Part II presents the history and operation of the Pelly
Amendment. Part Im analyzes the relevant issues in assessing the consis-
tency of the Pelly Amendment with the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).2
* The views expressed are those of the author only. An earlier version of Part
II of this Article appeared in the JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMEvT. The
author wishes to thank Jane Earley, Kim Elliott, Lee Jenkins. Ted McDorman. and
Anya Schoolman for their helpful comments.
1. 22 U.S.C.A § 1978 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30. 1947, 61 Stat. A3. 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
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I. TRADE SANCTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
It has long been recognized that international cooperation is essential
for solving many environmental problems.3 There is nothing remarkable
in this recognition. The same observation is true in many human en-
deavors, such as public health, trade, communications, monetary policy,
and the maintenance of peace. Because many environmental problems
cross national boundaries or involve areas beyond the regulatory authori-
ty of any one country, the environment is even more of an international
issue than are others.4 As Jozo Tomasevich, a professor at Stanford
University, pointed out fifty years ago:
if the concept of conservation is taken in its broad sense, meaning the
most rational use of natural resources at the disposal of mankind over a
period of time, the whole theory becomes closely related to the theory of
international economic relations. Without doubt, conservation policies in
various countries have international implications and repercussions that
need to be taken into account in an appraisal of particular conservation
policies.5
A. REASONS FOR COOPERATION
Countries have sought international cooperation on many issues of
environmental policy. For analytic purposes, one can divide these issues
into three categories: the global commons, regional matters, and non-
physical issues with moral or competitiveness implications. Each issue is
briefly discussed below.
The global commons is one area of longtime concern, and longtime
frustration. For example, in 1927, a League of Nations committee ad-
dressed the need for international rules regarding the exploitation of
products of the sea.6 The Committee pointed out that:
3. "Long" is a relative term. With respect to the span of human government,
the recognition is fairly recent, about a century old. But for as long as the environ-
ment has existed as a public policy concern, there has been an awareness that it is
an international issue.
4. Of course, many environmental issues may not require joint action (e.g., safe
drinking water).
5. Jozo Tomasevich, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CONSERVATION OF MA-
RINE RESOURCES 42 (1943).
6. See League of Nations, Comm. of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
Int'l Law, Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Questions Which
Appear Ripe for International Regulation, League of Nations Doc. C.196.M.70 123
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the riches of the sea, and especially the immense wealth of the Antarctic
region, are the patrimony of the whole human race. To save this wealth,
which, being to-day [sic] the uncontrolled property of all, belongs to no-
body, the only thing to be done is to discard the obsolete rules of the
existing treaties, which were drawn up with other objects, to take a wider
view, and to base a new jurisprudence, not on the defective legislation
which has failed to see justice done but on the scientific and economic
considerations which, after all the necessary data has been collected. may
be put forward, compared and discussed at a technical conference by the
countries concerned. In this way, a new jurisprudence will be created of
which to-day [sic] we have no inkling, owing to the fact that the neces-
sity which now arouses our legitimate apprehensions was never contem-
plated.
Whale hunting was of special concern to the Committee.8 Although
its recommendations did not have immediate impact, a group of whale
hunting countries agreed to a limited treaty regulating whale hunting in
19312 Although the Committee was overly optimistic about its ability
to achieve agreement based on scientific and economic considerations,
its forecast of a new jurisprudence, "of which today we have no in-
kling,"' may yet prove to be correct.
Another noteworthy attempt to achieve international cooperation oc-
curred in 1922 when the U.S. Congress authorized the president to call
for an international conference to prevent the pollution of navigable
waters." The Conference reached a common accord on preventing pol-
lution by oil or oil mixtures, but its draft treaty never entered into force.
Among the proposed rules, the treaty stated that tonnage duties "shall
not be charged in respect of any space rendered unavailable for cargo
by the installation of any device or apparatus for separating oil from
water."' 2 This was one of the earliest recognitions of the linkage be-
tween tariffs and pollution control.
(1927) [hereinafter Report to the Council] (recommending establishment of internation-
al regulations for exploitation of marine species).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Convention between the United States of America and other Powers for the
Regulation of Whaling, Mar. 31, 1932, 49 Stat. 3079 (1935).
10. Report to the Council, supra note 6, at 123.
11. See Act of July 1, 1922, 42 Stat. 821 (1922) (providing for the president to
call a conference of maritime nations).
12. Final Act, Article VI(b). Foreign Relations, 1926. Vol. J, at 238-47.
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Regional matters involving shared resource or trans-border damage is
a second area of longtime concern. Although an initial proposal for a
European convention for the protection of animals useful to agriculture
came in 1868, it was not until 1902 that such a convention was
signed. 3 This Convention only involved birds: They were viewed as a
shared resource because of their migratory nature in Europe. 4 The ear-
liest focus on trans-border damage involved the transmission of human,
animal, and plant disease. Numerous international conferences were held
on these issues beginning in the late nineteenth century.15
In many instances, international cooperation led to agreements using
trade controls. For example, the International Convention of 1902 for the
Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture required parties to prohibit the
importation and sale of certain eggs and nests. 6 The Convention De-
signed to Remove the Danger of Epizootic Diseases of 1887 between
Austria-Hungary and Italy prohibited trade in animals suspected of being
infected by a contagious disease.' 7
A third area of concern has been problems in other countries which
were not global or regional in scope. Very often, these problems in-
volved moral or competitiveness concerns. For example, in 1906, an
international conference in Bern devised a treaty to regulate the use of
phosphorus in match production and to prohibit trade in phosphorus
matches.'8 The rationale for international cooperation was that even
though the production of phosphorus matches was dangerous to workers,
no country would confront this problem alone because phosphorus sub-
stitutes were more expensive. Acting collectively, however, concerned
13. Convention on Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, Mar. 19, 1902, 191
CONSOL. T.S. 91, reprinted in 4 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
TREATIES & RELATED DOCUMENTS 1615 (Bernd Ruster & Bruno Simma eds., 1975);
see SHERMAN S. HAYDEN, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WILD LIFE, 92-96
(1942) (discussing proposals leading up to the treaty).
14. HAYDEN, supra note 13, at 92-96.
15. See NEVILLE M. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR WORK 39-79 (1952) (describing international sanitary conferences held in the
19th century).
16. Convention to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture, supra note 13.
17. Convention Designed to Remove the Danger of Epizootic Diseases, Dec. 7,
1887, Aus.-Hung.-Italy, 15 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. [deuxieme]) 704, reprinted
in 4 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES & RELATED Doc-
UMENTS, supra note 13, at 1586.
18. Convention Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of White (Yellow) Phos-
phorus in the Manufacture of Matches, Sept. 26, 1906, 203 CONSOL. T.S. 12.
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nations could protect workers in each country and move jointly to
strengthen labor standards.
It is important to recognize the difference between a bird protection
treaty and an occupational safety treaty. Bird protection requires interna-
tional cooperation because one country cannot save migratory birds on
its own. By contrast, one country can protect its own workers from
phosphorus. Political and economic factors, however, may often prevent
a country from adopting a more salutary policy. In such situations, inter-
national agreements will allow nations to upgrade their standards collec-
tively.
B. BARRIERS TO COOPERATION
International cooperation is often unattainable.'9 There are several
reasons for this. First, nations often place different values on protecting
the environment vis-.-vis other goals. Poorer countries are more short-
term oriented than richer countries. ' Second, even countries sharing the
same general environmental values will have different interests on partic-
ular issues. Land-locked nations, for instance, may have different views
on fishing conservation than riparian nations. Countries below sea level
may think differently about global warming than cold industrial coun-
tries. Third, some governments may not reflect the views of their pop-
ulace. This is common in non-democratic countries. Fourth, some gov-
ernments pursue policies that are not in their national interest.
In some cases, differences between countries could lead to situations
where there is no zone of agreement.-' In most cases, however, the
non-attainment of international cooperation results from bargaining fail-
ure. There are potential agreements that could make participants better
off, but the countries do not reach them because of bluffing. On many
issues, countries do not even commence serious negotiations.
19. See generally Scott Barrett, The Problem of Global Environmental Protection.
OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL., 68, 68 (1990) (discussing reasons why resource users
may fail to cooperate even when cooperation is in each user's interest).
20. Contra Riley E. Dunlap et. al.. Of Global Concern: Results of the Health of
the Planet Survey, ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1993 at 6. 9 (reporting that in a recent sur-
vey, the percentage of respondents who chose protecting the environment over eco-
nomic growth was inversely related to national income in the three NAFrA countries:
in Mexico, 71% chose the environment; in Canada 67% did: in the United States
only 58% did).
21. Of course, with large side payments, an agreement is attainable.
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C. TOOLS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION
Methods for countries and individual citizens to overcome barriers to
international agreements is a core issue in environmental policy. Ignor-
ing military tools, a country wanting to raise international environmental
standards can influence the policies of other countries in two ways.
First, countries can use political tools. For example, diplomats can try to
persuade one another of the need for cooperation. Media attention plays
an important intermediary role in this approach. Second, countries can
use economic tools. A government, for instance, might condition its
foreign aid or support for World Bank projects on the environmental
policy of a country.22 Groups of individuals can also launch boycotts.
Another common economic tool is the use of trade measures."
While this approach theoretically can include trade liberalization as an
inducement for cooperation, 4 the trade tools most often called upon are
trade restrictions. As William Phillips, chief of the international resourc-
es division of the U.S. Department of State, explained to the Senate in
1947, "Conservation, in my opinion, involves some sort of regulation of
world trade; otherwise I just don't see how it might operate. 23
In considering environmental trade restrictions, it is important to
distinguish between import prohibitions and sanctions. An import prohi-
bition-against endangered birds, for example-is a ban on a product
that has a direct nexus to an environmental harm. By contrast, a sanc-
tion is a trade ban on unrelated products for the purpose of influencing
a foreign country's policies or actions. Because sanctions are often im-
22. See Canute James, Whaling Controversy Threatens Tourism at 4 Caribbean
Isles, J. COM., Mar. 3, at 3A (noting the charge by environmentalists that Japanese
financial aid is designed to influence positions taken by recipient countries in the
International Whaling Commission).
23. See Steve Charnovitz, Encouraging Environmental Cooperation Through the
Pelly Amendment, J. Env. & Dev., 3, 5-9 (Winter 1994) (discussing the use of trade
carrots and sticks to influence the policies of other nations).
24. See International Convention Concerning the Export and Import of Animal
Products, Feb. 20, 1935, 193 L.N.T.S., art. 1 (1938) (using trade liberalization to
encourage higher health standards by providing duty-free treatment for countries that
ratified the International Convention for the Campaign Against Contagious Diseases of
Animals).
25. Trade Agreements System and Proposed International Trade Organization
Charter, 1947: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 80th Cong., 1st Sess 483
(1947) (statement of William Phillips).
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port prohibitions, one can view sanctions as a discrete type of import
prohibition rather than as a distinct instrument.
Both import prohibitions and sanctions can be applied by treaty to
other parties.2 6 They also can be applied by treaty to non-parties to
encourage nations to become parties.27 In the absence of a treaty, or
when treaties do not have adequate enforcement mechanisms, both im-
port prohibitions and sanctions can be applied unilaterally to prevent
environmental harm.' For example, the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of
1962 authorizes the president to raise tariffs on fish from countries that
do not negotiate in good faith for fishery conservation agreements.'
Because this provision is dormant, this study instead will examine a
subsequent unilateral trade sanction, the Pelly Amendment. "
D. OBJECTIONS TO SANCTIONS
So far, this Article has explained why the desired level of cooperation
may not occur and how nations might respond. Before proceeding with
a detailed discussion of the Pelly Amendment (Part II) and an analysis
of its GATT implications (Part III), it is useful to consider the following
queries: 1) whether unilateral trade measures achieve positive environ-
mental results, and 2) whether unilateral measures improve the prospects
for multilateral solutions.
The conventional wisdom is that both considerations should be an-
swered in the negative. For example, the GATI' Secretariat has pro-
nounced that "negative incentives-in particular, the use of discriminato-
ry trade restrictions on products unrelated to the environmental issue at
hand-are not an effective way to promote multilateral cooperation."'"
Piritta Sorsa, a World Bank economist, has written that, "unilateral sanc-
tions are unlikely to be effective in solving the cause of the environ-
26. See, e.g., Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, art. VI, Aug. 6. 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, 1704 (1916)
(applying import restrictions); North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, art. 36, done Sept. 8-14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480. 1493 (1993)
(permitting trade sanctions).
27. See, e.g., Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987 30 I.L.M. 157, art. 4 (1987) (Montreal Protocol) (applying import restrictions).
28. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. 1371 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994) (imposing a unilateral prohibition on imports of marine mammals and
marine mammal products).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988).
30. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1978 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
31. GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90-91, Vol. 1, at 21.
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mental damage. The polluter can always direct exports to other coun-
tries. 3 - W. Rob Storey, New Zealand's Minister of Transport, has stat-
ed that "[u]nilateral measures to reconcile trade and environmental ob-
jectives are likely to be ineffective or counterproductive."33 Additional-
ly, the National Consumer Council of the United Kingdom has declared
that "[t]rade sanctions are also likely to sour relations, making multilat-
eral cooperation much more difficult and international agreements harder
to achieve."' No empirical evidence, however, was offered to support
any of these statements.
II. PELLY AMENDMENT
Part II begins with a discussion of the legislative history of the Pelly
Amendment. Next, it considers other laws which trigger the Pelly
Amendment. Finally, it presents a case study of the Pelly Amendment.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Pelly Amendment of 1971"s is named after Congressman Thom-
as M. Pelly, who proposed the law at the end of his twenty year career
in the U.S. House of Representatives.36  This law revised the
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967."7 That Act, passed in 1968, did
not have a trade provision.
Congress enacted the Pelly Amendment in response to unsuccessful
U.S. efforts to persuade Denmark, Norway, and West Germany to com-
ply with the ban on high seas salmon fishing that was promulgated by
the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.38 All
32. Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing
Country Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 337, 337 (1992)
(Patrick Low ed.) (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 159).
33. W. Rob Storey, Trade and the Environment: New Zealand's Experience, in
AGRICULTURE, THE ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE-CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 242
(Caroline T. Williamson ed., 1993).
34. NATIONAL CONSUMER COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CONSUMER
AGENDA 131 (1993).
35. The Pelly Amendment was based on a similar provision enacted in 1962. 16
U.S.C. § 955, Pub. L. No. 87-814 § 2.
36. Congressman Pelly died in 1973.
37. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1978 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
38. See Gene S. Martin Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packvood-Magnuson
Amendments, 17 DENV. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y, 293-94 (1989) (stating that the Pelly
Amendment was enacted because under the terms of ICNAF, member states were free
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three countries agreed to phase out their salmon fishing after Pelly be-
came law. As enacted, the Pelly Amendment provided that:
[w]hen the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a foreign
country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a man-
ner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an interna-
tional fishery conservation program, the Secretary of Commerce shall cer-
tify such fact to the President. Upon receipt of such certification, the
President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the bringing
or the importation into the United States of fish products of the offending
country for such duration as the President determines appropriate and to
the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned by the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.39
The Pelly Amendment process is linked to acts of foreign persons, not
foreign governments.
In 1978, Congress added a new track to Pelly for "engaging in trade
or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any international pro-
gram for endangered or threatened species whether or not such conduct
is legal under the laws of the offending country. ' This provision is
triggered by a determination either of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
or Secretary of the Interior?" Following certification, the President
could order an embargo of any or all wildlife products from the certi-
fied country. "
As a result of the 1978 law, Pelly was divided into two tracks:"
diminishing the effectiveness of an international fishery program could
lead to sanctions against fish products;" and diminishing the effective-
to ignore the ban on salmon fishing).
39. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, § 8(a), 85 Stat. 786, 786 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §
1978 (Vest 1990)). For an international fishery program to qualify, the United States
had to be a signatory party. Id. at § 8(g)(3).
40. Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967. 92 Stat. 714 (1978) (codified at 22
U.S.C.A. § 1978 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)). The international program had to be in
force with respect to the United States. Id. at § 8(g)(5). Thus, for both fishery and
wildlife, Pelly is linked to international treaties which also bind the United States. It
is not clear whether the Pelly Amendment could be applied to soft law such as the
U.N. Driftnet Resolution. William T. Burke et al., United Nations Resolutions on
Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries
Management, in 25 OcEAN DEv. AND INT'L LAw 127 (April-June 1994).
41. Id. at § 8(a)(3).
42. Id. A certification means that a country fails to meet the U.S. standard.
43. See id. at §§ 8(a)(1) & (2) (creating separate certification procedures for fish
products and endangered species).
44. Id. at § 8(a)(3).
19941
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ness of an international endangered species program could lead to sanc-
tions against wildlife products.4" Although the goal pursued is a multi-
lateral one, the determination under Pelly of when actions diminish the
effectiveness of international programs is solely unilateral.
A test based on "diminishing the effectiveness" is rather vague. Many
factors could trigger a finding of diminished effectiveness. These factors
include non-ratification of a treaty, non-observance of a treaty, or even
actions .unrelated to a treaty such as domestic sales of an endangered
species. Pelly is not predicated on the violation of a treaty. For example,
the Whaling Convention permits member nations to avoid being bound
by a quota by entering an objection to it.46 Such an objection is legal
under the treaty and international law. It could still, however, trigger an
adverse Pelly ruling.
Although Pelly certifications are mandatory once a determination is
made, sanctions by the president are discretionary.47 Nevertheless, the
president is required to report to Congress within sixty days on any
action he takes and on the reasons why a full embargo of fish or wild-
life products was not ordered." In 1988, Congress modified the fishery
penalties to include "any aquatic species" exported from that country
regardless of whose nationals caught the fish.49
In 1992, Congress revised the Pelly Amendment to expand the range
of products against which a president could invoke countermeasures."
This change was needed, according to one House Committee, because
Pelly was "drawn so narrowly that an embargo under it could quite
45. Id. The use of fish products to retaliate against fishery violations does not
make the Pelly Amendment an import prohibition rather than a sanction. There is no
requirement that the fish product being retaliated against have anything to do with the
fishing that is environmentally-insensitive. Id.
46. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 161 U.N.T.S. 72,
art. V(3) (1953) (permitting any signatory nation to exempt itself from conservation
regulations).
47. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y 478 U.S. 221, 231-32
(1986) (finding by a five to four decision that there is no mandatory obligation for a
certification); see also id. (arguing that the regulation of future conduct is irrelevant
to the certification scheme which affects future violations only by punishing past
ones) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1978(h) (West 1990).
49. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, § 8(h)(4), 102 Stat.
4755, 4772 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1978(h)(4) (1988).
50. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, § 201(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4900.
4904 (1992) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4)).
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likely harm the United States more than the embargoed nation.' Un-
der the new law, the president can craft trade sanctions to have maxi-
mum impact. With both tracks, the president can order an embargo
against any products from the offending country.' The fish and wild-
life tracks remain distinct, however. The fishery track relates only to
fishery operations, not to trade. 3 The wildlife "track" relates both to
"taking" wildlife and to trade in it."
No legislative changes were made to the Pelly Amendment in 1993.
The U.S. House of Representatives did, however, pass a Concurrent
Resolution affirming the sense of Congress that non-compliance with
recommendations of the International Commission for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas55 "will be considered by Congress to be certifiable"
under the Pelly Amendment.
B. DEEMED PELLYS
There are several U.S. environmental laws linked to the Pelly Amend-
ment. Under these laws, various official determinations about foreign
government policies or production practices are "deemed" certifications
under Pelly and are handled like any other certification. Some of these
determinations involve international treaties and some do not. These
"deemed Pellys" are discussed briefly below.
1. Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,"7 also
known as the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment,"8 a certification by the
Secretary of Commerce that foreign nationals are "engaging in trade or
taking," which diminishes the effectiveness of the International Whaling
Convention, is deemed a Pelly certification.59 The only way this provi-
51. H.R. REP. No. 580, 101st Cong., pi. 1, at 4.
52. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, § 201(a)(l). 106 Stat. 4900.
4904 (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4)).
53. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 1978(h)(3) (West Supp. 1994) (defining a fishery conser-
vation program as one that protects the living resources of the sea, and thus including
whales and other marine mammals).
54. Id.
55. See International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, art. 3.
done May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887 (establishing International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas).
56. 139 CONG. REC. H8692-94 (1993).
57. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1822).
58. SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 34 (1985).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988); see Leonard F. Morley Jr.. Whaling Regula-
tion-Pely and Packiiood-Magntson. 11 SUFFOLK TRANsNAT'L L. J. 287 (1989) (dis-
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sion expands potential application of Pelly is by mandating certification
for trade in whales even though they may not be endangered.
2. Under the Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act
of 1987, 6 if the Secretary of Commerce determines that a foreign gov-
ernment fails within eighteen months to enter into an international agree-
ment on driftnet monitoring, that determination is deemed a Pelly certifi-
cation."
3. Under the African Elephant Conservation Act of 1988,6- if the Sec-
retary of the Interior finds that a country does not adhere to the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Ivory
Control system, that finding is deemed a Pelly certification.63
4. Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) amendments of
1988, the Secretary of Commerce must certify under Pelly any nation
whose yellowfin tuna is embargoed whenever the embargo continues for
more than six months.64
5. Under the Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, if the Secre-
tary of Commerce finds that a nation is engaging in trade in unlawfully
taken anadromous fish or fish products, that finding is deemed a Pelly
certification."5
6. Under the Driftnet Act Amendments of 1990, if the Secretary of
Commerce finds that a nation permits its "nationals to conduct large-
scale driftnet fishing in a manner that diminishes the effectiveness of or
is inconsistent with any international agreement governing large-scale
driftnet fishing," that finding is deemed a Pelly certification.'
7. Under the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992, the
Secretary of Commerce must certify each nation whose nationals are
conducting large-scale driftnet fishing.67 If consultations are not satis-
factory, the president must impose trade sanctions on fish, fish products
cussing congressional intent).
60. Pub. L. No. 100-220, 101 Stat. 1477 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1822).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1988). This provision has been used twice and is now
62. Pub. L. No. 100-478, tit. II, 102 Stat. 2315 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-
4245).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 4242 (1988). No action has been taken under this provision.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (1988). There have been several Pelly certifications
under this provision during the Bush and Clinton administrations. None, however,
have resulted in the imposition of trade sanctions.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1822 note (Supp. 1993). No action has been taken under this
provision.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(e)(6)(f) (Supp. 1993). This provision has been used twice.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1) (Supp. 1993).
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and sport fishing equipment.' If the Secretary of Commerce determines
that such sanctions are not sufficient to cause the nation to terminate
such driftnet fishing or determines that the foreign nation has retaliated
against the United States, then that determination is deemed a Pelly
certification.69
C. PELLY EPISODES
This section provides a short case history of all Pelly episodes relat-
ing to fishery or wildlife agreements. This section includes all certifica-
tions except for the numerous "deemed Pelly" certifications for dolphin-
tuna embargoes required by the MMPA. These certifications cover eight
different countries from 1974 to the present. Each episode is rated as
follows: successful, partly successful, or unsuccessful. If the episode is
successful, the Pelly threat led to a significant concurrent change in the
target country's policy in the direction sought by the U.S. Govern-
ment.70 Thus, a commitment to greater adherence to international stan-
dards by a foreign government would be deemed successful.
1. 1974-W-Japan and Soviet Union
In 1974, the Secretary of Commerce certified Japan and the Soviet
Union for exceeding the International Whaling Commission's (IWC)
quota for 1973-74 with respect to the minke whale.7 Both countries
had objected to the IWC quota, however, and were therefore not legally
bound by it.72 In announcing that he had decided against imposing
sanctions, President Ford explained that both countries had voted for the
1974-75 quotas which incorporated conservation improvements." He
also explained that imposing sanctions against Japan would result in
higher prices for American consumers.74 These episodes are rated as
successful because the two countries agreed to the IWC quota for the
next year.75
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3) (Supp. 1993).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(4) (Supp. 1993). No action has been taken under this
provision.
70. Strictly speaking, we are not really scoring Pelly but rather the effectiveness
of various administrations in using it. For purposes of simplicity, however, this score
will be treated as representing the effectiveness of the Pelly law.
71. GERALD R. FORD, PUB. PAPERS 47 (1975).
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 49.
75. H.R. Rep. No. 1029, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 9 (1978): see Lyster. supra note
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2. 1978-W-Chile, Peru, and South Korea
In 1978, the Secretary of Commerce certified Chile, Peru, and South
Korea for violating IWC quotas.76 None of the three countries were
members of the IWC.17 As a result of negotiations with the Carter ad-
ministration, all three countries agreed to join the IWC.7" President
Carter, therefore, decided not to impose trade sanctions. 9 These epi-
sodes are rated as successful because the countries joined the IWC.
3. 1985-W-Soviet Union
In 1985, the Secretary of Commerce certified the Soviet Union for
violating the IWC's whale quota for the 1984-85 season."0 The Soviet
Union had objected to the IWC quota."s Nevertheless, the certification
stated that the Soviet actions were "inconsistent with this international
conservation standard. '8 2 President Reagan declined to impose trade
sanctions against the Soviet Union." His decision noted no remedial
steps by the Soviets, but explained that a sanction would "have a negli-
gible effect" as Soviet exports were marketable elsewhere.' It should
be noted that the Soviet Union was also certified under the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment under which the Soviet fishing allocation in the
United States exclusive economic zone had been cut in half.85 Thus,
contemporaneous countermeasures were already in place. This episode is
rated as unsuccessful because the Pelly threat did not affect Soviet be-
havior.
58, at 35 (noting that the president's expectation that Japan and the Soviet Union
would abide by future quotas was fulfilled).
76. JIMMY CARTER, PUB. PAPERS 265-66 (1979).
77. See id. at 266 (noting that the three countries are becoming members of the
IWC).
78. Id. at 267.
79. Id. at 268.
80. RONALD REAGAN, PUB. PAPERS 704 (1985). The Soviet Union was also certi-
fied under the Packwood Magnuson amendment for whaling operations. LYSTER, supra
note 58, at 35.
81. RONALD REAGAN, PUB. PAPERS 704 (1985).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 705.
84. Id. at 704-05.
85. Id. at 704.
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4. 1986-W-Norway
In 1986, the Secretary of Commerce certified Norway for violating
the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling.' Norway had objected to
the zero quotas and was therefore not bound by them. s Less than a
month after the Pelly certification, Norway announced that it would
suspend commercial whaling after the 1987 season and would reduce its
catch for that year.' President Reagan then decided not to impose
sanctions." This episode is rated as successful because Norway agreed
to suspend commercial whaling after that season.
5. 1988-W-Japan
In 1988, the Secretary of Commerce certified Japan for conducting
"research" whaling in violation of an IWC resolution." Finding no evi-
dence that Japan was bringing its whale hunting program into confor-
mance with the IWC, President Reagan decided to deny fishing privileg-
es to Japan in the United States exclusive economic zone under
Packwood-Magnuson.9 ' No Pelly sanctions, however, were imposed.'
This episode is rated as unsuccessful because Pelly did not affect
Japan's behavior.
6. 1989-DN-Taiwan
In 1989, the Secretary of Commerce certified Taiwan for failing to
enter into the cooperative scientific monitoring and enforcement agree-
ment called for in the U.S. Driftnet legislation. " Following certifica-
tion, Taiwan entered into an agreement.' President Bush, therefore, did
86. RONALD REAGAN, PUB. PAPERS 1051 (1968).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. RONALD REAGAN, PUB. PAPERS 704 424-25 (1988). The whaling, however,
apparently did not violate the Convention. Japan was also certified under Packwood
Magnuson for whaling operations.
91. Id. at 425 (1988).
92. Id.
93. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 1112 (1989). Although Taiwan and Korea were
included in the same certification and presidential decision, the two episodes are sep-
arated here because the outcomes are different. Id. Compare this to the 1974 and
1978 certifications where the outcomes were the same.
94. Id.
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not impose sanctions.95 This episode is rated as successful because the
United States and Taiwan reached an agreement.96
7. 1989-DN-South Korea
In 1989, the Secretary of Commerce certified South Korea for failing
to enter into the cooperative scientific monitoring and enforcement
agreement called for in the U.S. Driftnet legislation.' Although Korea
had not yet concluded an agreement, President Bush decided not to
impose sanctions at that time.98 President Bush did, however, intimate
that he might impose trade sanctions at a later date if "significant move-
ment" was not made. 9' Later that year, Korea concluded an agree-
ment."° This episode is rated as partly successful. The Pelly threat was
unsuccessful within the sixty-day period between certification and the
presidential decision; but a rating of unsuccessful would seem too harsh
because the U.S. goal was later attained. It is unclear, however, how
much one can credit the latent threat of Pelly certification with success
because the United States may have used other diplomatic leverage.
8. 1990-W-Norway
In 1990, the Secretary of Commerce certified Norway for taking
minke whales in violation of IWC research criteria.' In announcing
that he would not impose sanctions, President Bush stated that Norway
was making progress in its "program and presentation" and noted cur-
rent efforts to improve U.S.-Norwegian scientific consultations."" 2 This
episode is rated as unsuccessful because Pelly did not affect Norway's
whale-hunting behavior.
95. See id. (stating that no action is being taken).
96. Jane Kathryn Jenkins, International Regulation of Driftnet Fishing: The Role
of Environmental Activism and Leverage Diplomacy, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
197, 212-18 (1993).
97. Id. A president retains the power to impose sanctions at a later date when a
final negative decision is not made.
98. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 1112 (1989).
99. Id. Bush did not explicitly threaten sanctions. Rather he said he would "be
prepared to exercise my substantial authorities under the Pelly Amendment." Id.
100. Id. at 1214.
101. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 1811 (1990).
102. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 1811-12 (1990).
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9. 1991-E-Japan
In 1991, the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Commerce
certified Japan for engaging in trade in hawksbill and olive ridley sea
turtles, both of which were listed in CITES Appendix .'( Japan had
reserved on these turtles when it joined CITES in 1981 and, therefore,
its action did not violate the treaty." 4 After the Bush administration
announced a list of products upon which it might impose sanctions,
Japan agreed to limit its imports of both turtles in 1991 and to end all
trade by the end of 1992." President Bush therefore decided not to
impose sanctions."° This episode is rated as successful because Japan
made a commitment to end its turtle trade.
10. 1991-DN-South Korea
In 1991, the Secretary of Commerce certified South Korea for vio-
lating the terms of its driftnet agreement with the United States." Fol-
lowing certification, Korea recalled to port those national vessels that
were fishing in contradiction to the agreement.'" As a result, President
Bush decided not to impose sanctions." This episode is rated as suc-
cessful because Korea took immediate action against its nationals."'
11. 1991-DN-Taiwan
In 1991, the Secretary of Commerce certified Taiwan for violating the
terms of its driftnet agreement with the United States."' Following
certification, Taiwan did not recall its vessels, but stated in a letter to
103. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 521 (1991); Keith Schneider. U.S. Moves to
Punish Japan for Trade in Turtles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at A12.
104. See id. (noting that Japan reserved on hawksbill and olive ridley sea turtles
and thus continued to trade in them).
105. David E. Sanger, Japan, Backing Down, Plans Ban on Rare Turtle Import.
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at D6.
106. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 521 (1991).
107. Id. at 1307. Although Korea and Taiwan were included in the same certifica-
tion and Presidential decision, the two episodes are separated here because the out-
comes were different. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. (stating that besides recalling its vessels, the government imposed
penalties on the owners and masters of 14 vessels that were in violation).
111. Id.
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the United States that it would end driftnet fishing by June 30,
1992."' As a result, President Bush decided not to impose sanc-
tions. '1 3 This episode is rated as partially successful. While Taiwan did
not take immediate steps to abide by its agreement with the United
States, it did agree to abide by the United Nations Driftnet Resolution in
the future.
12. 1992-W-Norway
In 1992, the Secretary of Commerce certified Norway for killing
whales for "research" purposes in a manner inconsistent with IWC crite-
ria." 4 In issuing his decision, President Bush noted that he was "great-
ly concerned" that Norway had announced that it would resume com-
mercial whaling." 5 Nevertheless, he declined to impose sanctions."6
This episode is rated as unsuccessful because Pelly did not affect
Norway's behavior.
13. 1993-W-Norway
In August 1993, the Secretary of Commerce certified Norway for
violating the IWC zero catch limit on minke whales by killing 157
whales." 7 Norway argued that the minke whale was not endan-
gered." 8 The IWC, however, included this whale in its zero catch lim-
it." 9 Moreover, the minke whale is on CITES Appendix .i20 Norway
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. GEORGE BUSH, PUB. PAPERS 2213 (1992).
115. Id. at 2214.
116. Id.
117. Clay Erik Hawes, Noregian Whaling and the Pelly Amendment: A Misguided
Attempt at Conservation, MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE, Spring 1994, at 97; Cliff M.
Stein, Whales Swivn for Their Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a Nonvegian Uni-
form: An Analysis of Norvay's Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L. J. Spring 1994 at 5; Commerce Department Certifies Norway for Com-
mercial Whaling Resumption, Press Release, Aug. 5, 1993; INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov.
10, 1993, at 1912. Norway also killed 136 whales for "research" purposes. Abuses of
research whaling was the subject of the 1992 Pelly certification. The 1993 certifica-
tion covered only commercial whaling, not research whaling.
118. See Brown Raises Threat of Sanctions Against Norvay in Whaling Dispute,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 13, 1993, at 8.
119. International Whaling Commission, Schedule l0e.
120. Minke whales caught off the coast of west Greenland are on Appendix II.
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also argued that it was not legally bound by the zero catch limit since it
had entered a reservation under IWC procedures.
In October 1993, President Clinton stated that although "Norway's
action is serious enough to justify sanctions," he would nevertheless not
impose them." This episode is rated as unsuccessful because Pelly did
not affect Norway's behavior. According to press accounts, Norway's
role in the Middle East peace process influenced the administration's
decision against the imposition of trade sanctions." Norway has an-
nounced that it will continue whale hunting in 1994. "
14. 1993-E-China and Taiwan
In November 1992, two environmental groups petitioned the Secretary
of the Interior to invoke the Pelly Amendment against Taiwan, China,
South Korea and the Republic of Yemen for continuing to engage in the
trading of rhinoceros horns.'24 Following discussions with the United
States, both Korea and Yemen agreed to accede to CITES and to close
down their domestic rhino trade."
In September 1993, the Standing Committee of CITES adopted a
decision stating that:
measures taken by the People's Republic of China and the competent
authorities in Taipei are not adequate to sufficiently control illegal trade
in rhinoceros horn and tiger parts, including failure to comply with mea-
sures outlined in Resolution Conf. 6.10. Parties should consider imple-
menting stricter domestic measures up to and including prohibition in
trade and wildlife species now.'26
121. Message to the Congress on Whaling Activities in Norway. WEEKLY CoMP.
PREs. Doc. 2000, 2001 (Oct. 4, 1993). President Clinton ordered that a list of poten-
tial trade sanctions in seafood products be drawn up. Id.
122. See Hugh Camegy, Nonvay Seeks US go-ahead for Whaling, FIN. TMES, Oct.
6, 1993, at 6 (stating that Norway will try to persuade the United States at the IWC
meeting in May 1994 to support a resumption of commercial whaling); see Is This
Really a Good Time to Punish Nonvay?, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A22 (urg-
ing President Clinton to take into account Norway's behind the scenes assistance to
Israeli and Palestinian negotiators).
123. Nonvay will Permit Limited Whale Hunt, J. CoM. June 13, 1994 at 5A.
124. Administration Moves to Halt International Trade in Tiger and Rhino Parts,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR NEWs RELEASE, June 9, 1993.
125. See id. (describing that as a result of the efforts of both Korea and Yemen
to terminate effectively their rhino trading, the Interior Department is withholding
Pelly Amendment certification).
126. Rhinoceros and Tiger: Tine For a Decision, CITES PRESS RELEAsF Sept. 9.
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An earlier resolution in 1987 urged all parties to ban completely all
sales and trade, domestically and internationally, of rhinoceros parts and
to destroy all government stocks of rhinoceros horns. -7 It also recom-
mended that the parties "use all appropriate means, including economic,
political and diplomatic, to exert pressure on countries continuing to
allow trade in rhinoceros horn . . .28
Concurrently with the CITES meeting, the Secretary of the Interior
certified China and Taiwan for trade in both rhino horns and tiger
bones. 29 Although China agreed to outlaw trade in rhinos, the United
States Government had pressed for China to commit to the destruction
of existing stockpiles, as recommended by CITES Conference Resolution
6.10.3' Although Taiwan banned domestic and international trade of
both species in 1985, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service found that
Taiwan's enforcement efforts were "not sufficiently effective" and that
its penalties were "weak."'' The certification stated that both countries
fell short of international conservation standards.'32
In November 1993, President Clinton decided against imposing trade
sanctions. 3 3 Although he noted that the rhino and tiger "population
will likely be extinct in the next two to five years if the trade in their
parts and products is not eliminated," he still concluded that both coun-
tries had, since the Pelly certification, "undertaken some positive leg-
islative and administrative steps."'34 The President expressed his hope
that China and Taiwan could "demonstrate measurable, verifiable, and
1993.
127. Trade in Rhinoceros Products, CITES RES. OF THE CONF. OF THE PARTIES
6.10 (1987).
128. Id.
129. Letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the President Sept. 7, 1993.
130. Conference on International Trade in Endangered Species 1973, T 6.10, 993
U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; see Jeremy Mark, China and Taiwan Face U.S.
Sanctions for Trafficking in Endangered Species, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1993, at A3
(describing a warning issued by the United States that it may consider trade sanctions
against Taiwan and China unless the illegal trade in rhino horns and tiger body parts
ceases).
131. U.S. Department of Interior, Press Release, Sept. 7, 1993.
132. CITES Article VIII: I requires that parties "take appropriate measures to
enforce the provisions of the present Convention .... .. This includes measures to
penalize trade in, or possession of, specimens.
133. President's Message to the Congress on Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade by China
and Taiwan, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2300 (Nov. 8, 1993) [hereinafter
President's Message].
134. Id.
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substantial progress by March 1994." Otherwise, he said, "import prohi-
bitions will be necessary, as recommended by the CITES Standing Com-
mittee."'
135
In March 1994, the CITES Standing Committee found that China had
met the minimum requirements put forth in the September decision, but
stated that further action by China was needed.'" Regarding Taiwan,
the Committee found that the minimum requirements had not been
met. 37 In April 1994, President Clinton announced that because of
Taiwan's lack of progress, he was ordering a ban on certain wildlife
specimens and products from Taiwan."' This involves about twenty
million dollars in annual trade. 39 As of August 1, 1994 this ban has
not yet been imposed.
Since this episode continues to evolve, it is not easy to rate. Both
countries have taken some actions, but the pace of reform may be too
slow to save the rhinos and tigers." As a provisional rating, this ana-
lyst will score Taiwan as unsuccessful and China as partly successful.
Some wildlife experts deprecate this distinction, saying that the Chinese
are among the worst offenders. 4 ' One hypothesis for why President
did not impose sanctions on both countries is that he was facing an
impending, controversial decision as to whether to reextend most-fa-
vored-nation privileges to China. If he imposed Pelly sanctions, that
could make it harder to renew China's most-favored-nation status. Crit-
135. Id.
136. CITES Standing Committee on Trade in Rhinoceros Horn and Tiger Speci-
mens, March 25, 1994, 7 at 660. The matter will be reviewed at the meeting of
the Conference of the Parties in November 1994.
137. Id. 8.
138. 59 FED. REG. 22043 (1994).
139. See Tom Kenworthy, President Imposes Sanctions on Taiwan. WASH. POST.
April 12, 1994, at C1. Taiwan responded that "dialogue and cooperation, rather than
sanctions, are the best means of achieving progress." Id.
140. According to Ginette Hemley of the orld Wildlife Fund, "Literally every day
counts." Clinton Threatens to Impose Sanctions on China, Taiwan for Tiger. Rhino
Trade, DAILY REP. ExEc. (BNA), § A (Nov. 9. 1993).
141. See James Sheehan, Most Favored Fauna Treatment. WASH. TIMES. May 31.
1994, at A12 (noting that environmentalists claim that China is a more egregious
violator of CITES and requires far more animal-sensitivity training than Taiwan); see
also Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Puts Sanctions on Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, April 12.
1994, at DI. There was some support in Congress for a ban on both countries. Con-
gress Urges Ban on Wildlife Imports from Taiwan, China. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, April
1, 1994, at S-6.
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ics would say that the Clinton Administration cared more about tiger
rights than about human rights.
D. ASSESSMENT OF THE PELLY AMENDMENT
Because no Pelly penalties have ever been imposed, this section only
evaluates the effectiveness of threatened trade countermeasures, that is,
the extent to which Pelly led to policy reform or commitments to re-
form. It should be noted that a number of countries took action follow-
ing a threat of Pelly certification, and thus were never certified.'
These "successes" are not tallied here. It should also be noted that there
are only a handful of data points, based on admittedly subjective judg-
ments. Accordingly, the conclusions drawn here should be viewed as
suggestive only.
Utilization of the Pelly Amendment increased in recent years. Be-
tween 1971 and 1978, the first eight years of the program, there were
five episodes.'43 In the next eight years, there were two episodes.
There were seventeen episodes over the past seven years. In these eigh-
teen episodes, fifty percent were successful, seventeen percent were
partly successful, and thirty-three percent were unsuccessful. The average
success rate was fifty-eight percent."'
The second certification of a country for a particular issue has almost
always been less successful than the initial one.'45 For example, the
Soviet whale certification of 1974 was successful, but the 1985 certifica-
tion was not. The Japan whale certification of 1974 was successful, but
the 1988 certification was not. The 1986 Norway whale certification was
successful, but the 1990, 1992, and 1993 certifications were not. The
Bush administration's inaction on whale "research" in 1992 may have
been an important factor in Norway's decision to follow through with its
announcement that it would commence whaling.'46
142. Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229
(1986); see Martin Jr. and Brennan, supra note 38, at 299-301 (describing a 1985
Japanese whaling case where Japan agreed to withdraw its objection to the IWC
moratorium if the United States did not complete its certification of Japan).
143. Certifications with three countries are counted as three episodes.
144. Successful is scored as 1.0, partly successful as 0.5, and unsuccessful as 0.
145. Nevertheless, one must note that there are not many data points. There are
also many independent variables that could be more important than a repeat certifica-
tion variable.
146. See Anthony D. Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right
to Life, 85 AM. J. INT. L. & POL'Y 21, 48 n.192 (1991) (describing the number of
whales killed in the name of research).
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This pattem of declining effectiveness suggests that the "shock" of
certification wears off quickly. One also might expect the Pelly Amend-
ment to be less effective over time given the absence of any imposition
of sanctions. Whether the Pelly reforms of 1992, expanding potential
sanctions to all products, will increase the success rate remains unclear.
So far it has not; at least three of the certifications under the new law
have failed. The Clinton administration's decision to ban only wildlife
imports from Taiwan and to draw up a list of seafood products for
possible future sanctions against Norway is noteworthy because the ad-
ministration appears to be avoiding any use of the expanded powers."
The Pelly Amendment's overall fifty-eight percent success rate is im-
pressive, particularly in the absence of any actual sanction. This success
rate is also noteworthy when compared to the effectiveness of other
economic sanctions. For example, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott found
the overall success rate for foreign policy sanctions since World War I
to be thirty-four percent. 4 For foreign policy sanctions imposed by
the United States since 1973, coincident with the period of the Pelly
Amendment, the success rate has been only seventeen percent.' The
threatened use of Pelly sanctions also compares favorably to the threat-
ened use of Section 301 trade penalties. 50 Data compiled by Bayard
and Elliott show that since 1975, the overall success rate for Section
301 has been thirty-seven percent.'
147. Message to the Congress on Whaling Activities of Norway, WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 2000-01 (Oct. 11, 1993).
148. 1 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER Er AL., EcoNoMIic SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:
HIsTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 108 (2nd ed. 1990).
149. See id., at 108 (describing success with eight of forty-six foreign policy sanc-
tions imposed by the United States since 1973).
150. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is designed to respond to foreign trade
practices that are unjustifiable, discriminatory, or unreasonable. So far, it is mainly
used to remove foreign barriers to U.S. exports of goods or services. Some commen-
tators see similarities between the "aggressive unilateralism" of Section 301 and the
use of unilateral environmental trade measures. There is some similarity, but far larger
differences. Section 301 aims to change foreign commercial practices to help Ameri-
can exporters. Environmental trade measures do not have commercial goals and may
hurt U.S. exports. Their purpose is to change foreign environmental practices to safe-
guard the environment.
151. The authors calculate a success rate of 52% using a different methodology
that counts a partial success as a total success. The 37% figure is an adjustment to
conform to weighted methodology used here.
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Several objections are commonly raised against "pellying,"' 5 2 in ad-
dition to the potential GATT violation. The principal objection is that
Pelly is unilateral. Indeed, Pelly can be unilateral in three ways: setting
the standard countries should apply; judging whether countries have met
that standard; and determining what penalty should be impose. Clearly,
the driftnet deemed Pellys are unilateral in all three ways because they
had no direct connection to international agreements.5 3 The situation is
not as clear with regard to the other Pelly cases because they were
linked to the standards of either the IWC or CITES. Because the certifi-
cation is based on a U.S. judgment as to whether the foreign action
diminishes the effectiveness of the treaty, even those Pellys could be
viewed as unilateral in all three ways.
Critics claim that the "diminish the effectiveness" standard is too
broad. It is one thing to pelly a country for violating a treaty, and an-
other thing to pelly it for actions that may undermine the treaty but are,
nonetheless, legal under the treaty. It can be argued that such non-viola-
tion pellys may reduce the incentive for joining a treaty. The same issue
arose in 1919 during the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles. An early
British draft for the International Labour Organization recommended
trade sanctions for violating a labor treaty, but recommended against
sanctions for refusing to adhere to a treaty on the grounds that "it
would drive all the smaller and backward States to combine in order to
prevent the conclusion of any Convention which, on a basis of equal
voting, they would probably be able to do successfully."'' 4
This discussion of Pelly points to several possibilities for reform of
the legislation. First, Congress should make a distinction in Pelly be-
tween countries that fail to join a treaty, join but violate, and join and
adhere, but nonetheless "diminish the effectiveness." Even if one wants
to maintain countermeasures for all three types, it is useful, nevertheless,
to recognize the distinctions. Countries with different records should not
be lumped together. Some observers might view distinguishing between
152. To certify a country under the Pelly Amendment.
153. The 1990 Driftnet "deemed Pelly" mandates certification for fishing in a
manner that diminishes the effectiveness of any international governing large-scale
driftnet fishing. Yet, the 1991 certifications were for violating the bilateral monitoring
agreement with the United States. (The 1989 certifications were for not signing bi-
lateral agreements).
154. Memorandum on the Machinery and Procedure for the International Regula-
tion of Industrial Conditions, Document 25, in 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATION-
AL LABOR ORGANIZATION, 125 (J. Shotwell ed., 1934).
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countries that fail to join a treaty as the least objectionable of the three
possibilities, while others might view it as the most objectionable.
Second, Pelly could have closer ties to international standard-setting
and international decision-making about violations. Currently, the judg-
ment about whether foreign actions impede the execution of a treaty is
up to the secretaries of commerce and interior. Instead, one could look
to an IWC or CITES conference to make such determinations. This is
already happening to some extent under CITES, with recommendations
to implement "stricter domestic measures"'55 and to "exert pressure" on
particular countries. 5 ' Third, Congress might reduce the discretion of
the president not to impose trade sanctions. It is interesting to compare
the Pelly Amendment, where the president has complete discretion, with
the MMPA, where the Secretary of Commerce was required by the law
and by the federal court to impose a tuna embargo on countries like
Mexico. Although there is a broad range of views as to the appropriate-
ness of actions and inactions under both of the programs, it seems rea-
sonable that the executive branch ought to have greater discretion with a
sanction than with an import prohibition. Nevertheless, the continued
unwillingness of presidents to impose Pelly sanctions combined with an
apparent decline in the value of the Pelly threat will strengthen the posi-
tion of those in the Congress who want to reduce the president's discre-
tion.
Fourth, the United States should attempt to get other countries to im-
pose similar actions by joint agreement. At this time, no other country
has a Pelly-type amendment. The United States, therefore, would be less
vulnerable to charges of arbitrary action if environmentally-necessary
sanctions were coordinated by a group of countries.
III. GAIT IMPLICATIONS OF THE PELLY AMENDMENT
Part Ill considers whether the imposition of a Pelly sanction violates
the GATT. This section first addresses the relevant GATT rules and
then considers implementation issues. Because of the vagueness of the
GATT provisions and the lack of authoritative rulings, it is impossible
to provide a definitive answer to the question of Pelly's GATT consis-
tency. Whether or not it is consistent depends largely on the disposition
of the controversial GATT Panel decision in the dolphin-tuna case of
155. CITES, supra note 130. art. XIV: I(a).
156. Of course, if Pelly action were made contingent on such determinations. it
could become much more difficult for CITES to issue such determinations.
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1991 (Dolphin I Report).'57 The Dolphin I Report has not been adopt-
ed by the GATT Council.
A. GATT RULES
Because the Pelly Amendment is either a trade sanction, or counter-
measure, 5 ' it runs afoul of a basic GATT rule prohibiting trade dis-
crimination-the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle in Article I. 159
GATT applies its non-discrimination rule in a discriminatory fashion
because it permits discrimination against non-parties to the GATT.
160
For example, because China and Taiwan are not GAIT members, parties
have no obligations under GATT not to discriminate against them. Nei-
ther country could lodge a complaint in the GATT about the use of the
Pelly Amendment.
If the trade sanction were an import ban, it would also violate GATT
Article XI-the general elimination of quantitative restrictions. Article
XI forbids prohibitions or restrictions other than certain duties and taxes.
Article XI provides for three exceptions, but none of them are applica-
ble to typical environmental trade measures.'6 ' Because a trade mea-
sure under Pelly applies exclusively to imported goods, such a sanction
could not qualify as an internal measure under GAIT Article III. Addi-
157. Gatt Dispute Settlement Panel Rep.: United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 39th Supp. 107 (1991),
reproduced in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Dolphin I Report].
158. See ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S.
LEGISLATION 92-93 (1985) (suggesting that the Pelly amendment is not a true sanction
because it aims merely to exercise enough pressure to prevent a foreign state from
jeopardizing specific collective interests).
159. GATT, art. I. Discrimination means treating a specific product from one
country unfavorably compared to a like product from another. Id. There is no general
GATT rule against trade sanctions. It is interesting to note that the Charter of the
International Trade Organization contained a commitment that members "will not have
recourse to unilateral economic measures of any kind contrary to the provisions of
this charter." Charter for the International Trade Org., U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment, U.N. ICITO/I/4 (1948), at Art. 92:1.
160. Note further that even though the GATT permits discrimination against non-
parties and the Montreal Protocol requires discrimination against non-parties, GATT
rules could prohibit carrying out this Montreal Protocol obligation against GATT
parties.
161. See Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embar-
goes to Stop Drifinet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 477, 513-15 (1991) (discussing agricultural and fisheries exception);
see also GATIT, art. III (requiring national treatment for imported goods).
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tionally, because no treaty requires Pelly sanctions," there is no way
that U.S. action under Pelly could supersede U.S. obligations to other
GATT members as a more recent treaty. The only way that a Pelly
sanction could be GATT-legal, therefore, is through one of the general
exceptions in GATT Article XX.
B. ARTICLE XX
Article XX cannot be invoked by a country merely because an im-
ported product fails to meet an environmental standard, whether domes-
tic or international."a It can be invoked only if commerce in, produc-
tion of, or consumption of the traded good leads to a situation specifi-
cally covered by one of the listed exceptions. For example, the Pelly
certification of China and Taiwan states that the government policies of
these two countries "fall short of the international conservation standards
of CITES."'" This finding alone does not qualify a trade measure un-
der Article XX(b) or (g), however, because neither of these exceptions
hinge on the adherence of an import to an international standard. Unlike
the GATT, other international trade conventions, such as the Internation-
al Convention of 1923 on the Simplification of Customs Formalities, ex-
plicitly yield to existing or future international agreements intended to
preserve the health of human beings, animals, or plants."
162. The declarations noted above by the CITES Standing Committee and Confer-
ence of the Parties are formulated as recommendations.
163. GAIT, art. XX. Article XX provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption
ld.
164. See Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior. (Sept. 7. 1993) (on
file with The American University Journal of International Law & Policy) (certifying
that the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are engaged in trade in rhinoceros
and tiger parts).
165. International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities,
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Article XX is not administered on the honor system." 6 It is up to
the GATT Contracting Parties to determine whether an Article XX ex-
ception is available for specific environmental trade measures. 67 Al-
though Article XX does not state this explicitly, the intent of the draft-
ers is evident by comparing Article XX to the national security provi-
sions of Article XXI. Under Article XXI, a GATT member may use any
trade restriction it considers necessary.'68
Article XX does not state which party has the burden of proof when
a dispute arises. In recent cases, GATT Panels have assigned the burden
to countries whose trade measures are the subject of the complaint. 69
The provisions in the headnote can be viewed as gateway requirements
to gain access to the exceptions in the Article XX subsections.
Professor John Jackson has described the provisions in the headnote
as a "softer" form of GATT's rules regarding non-discrimination and na-
tional treatment. 70 The "arbitrary or unjustifiable" proviso is softer in
two ways. First, non-arbitrary or justifiable discrimination is permit-
ted.' Second, there is no "like product" requirement in Article XX.
Rather than considering whether like products from different countries
have equal opportunities in the domestic market, Article XX examines
30 L.N.T.S. 373, 409 (1923) (Protocol).
166. In a 1947 analysis, however, the U.S. Tariff Commission suggested that the
headnote requirements in the General Exceptions were not intended to be reviewable
by the International Trade Organization. See U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, ANALYSIS
GENEVA DRAFT OF CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 61
(1947) ("There is, however, no provision for any determination by the Organization as
to whether measures taken are unjustifiably discriminatory or constitute a disguised
restriction on trade").
167. See GA7T Dispute Settlement Panel Report: United States--Imports on Cer-
tain Automotive Spring Assemblies, in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, 30th Supp. 107, at 56 (1984) (explaining that the application of the
measure rather than the measure itself should be examined).
168. GATT, art. XXI(b).
169. See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, in GATT, BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 36th Supp. 345, at 5.27 (1990) (noting
that the party seeking justification bears the burden of demonstrating that measures
are necessary).
170. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 207 (1989).
171. The meaning of "unjustifiable" in the context of Article XX has not been
sufficiently explored. For instance, one may question whether it is justifiable for the
United States to ban tuna from countries where dolphin-unsafe harvesting methods are
used, but to allow tuna imports from countries where dolphins are routinely caught
and eaten. See Felipe Charat, Mexico: No Threat to Dolphins, 5 J. Comm., Nov. 5,
1991, at 8A.
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whether countries "where the same conditions prevail" are treated in an
arbitrary or unjust fashion. If so, that violates the headnote.
In countries where the same conditions do not prevail, arbitrary or
unjust discrimination is not contrary to the headnote. Article XX was
based on a very similar provision in the Trade Convention of 1927."
During its drafting, the League of Nations Economic Committee stated
that this provision "in no way limits the right of States to take measures
against a particular country where conditions are not the
")173
sam e . .. .
Although the meaning of "same conditions" is not clear from the
drafting history, one can infer its meaning from the agricultural disputes
that were common at that time. For example, one condition might
be whether an agricultural disease is endemic to a country. If Country Y
had cattle trichinosis and Country Z did not, it would not be arbitrary
for the United States to ban meat from Y but not from Z. Another
possible Article XX condition, according to the GATT Secretariat, might
be whether a country has ratified an international environmental trea-
ty.75 Yet another Article XX condition, according to the European
Commission, might be whether a country complies with an international
treaty.17
6
Under Article XX, the conditions considered in the headnote must be
pertinent to the specific exception being implicated. In other words,
under Article XX(b), the conditions considered in a trade measure have
to relate to the health of humans, animals, or plants. For example, a
government might ban CFC imports from countries that had not ratified
the Montreal Protocol. A government could not, however, use Article
172. International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions
and Restrictions, Nov. 8, 1927, art. 4, 97 L.N.T.S. 393.
173. See League of Nations, "Commentary and Preliminary Draft International
Agreement Drawn Up by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations To
Serve as a Basis for an International Diplomatic Conference," 1927, League Dec.
C.I.A.P. 1, at 27.
174. U.S. Tariff Commission, DICrIONARY OF TARIFF INFORMATION 603-04 (1924);
LAWRENCE W. TOWLE, INTERNA'IONAL TRADE AND COMMERCIAL PoucY 362-64
(1947).
175. GATT, Trade and Environment, Factual Note by the Secretariat, at 32 GATT
Doc. L6896, (Aug. 1991).
176. Specifically, whether or not a country applies "equivalent environmental guar-
antees" to those in the treaty. See EC Proposal on Trade and Environment, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 1992, at S-4.
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XX(b) to ban CFC imports from countries that had not ratified the Con-
vention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization."
The "disguised restriction" prerequisite looks at the intent of the trade
provision. It applies whether or not the same conditions prevail. This
prerequisite is important because it enables the GATT to distinguish be-
tween legitimate environmental trade measures, which are GATT-legal,
and contrived or veiled measures, which could be GATT-illegal. Because
every trade measure-a tariff, tax or regulation-is qualified in some
way, GATT can look at any questionable limitation to ascertain its
relevance to health or conservation. Despite this broad authority, this
anti-protectionism rule has been virtually ignored by the GATT.'78
C. ARTICLE XX(B)
Commentators have suggested that Article XX(b) was meant to cover
only sanitary or quarantine laws.' Former Senator Lloyd Bentsen
once declared that "Article XX really refers to trying to protect against
contaminated meat, against rabid dogs, and against infected plant
life."' ° This argument, however, is inconsistent with GATT negotiating
history because the Charter of the International Trade Organization
(ITO) specifically took note of both the "operation of sanitary laws" and
"regulations for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health."''
At least one commentator has suggested that Article XX(b) is too
limited to cover many important environmental trade measures.' Arti-
177. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Apr. 26,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 1749.
178. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: Thailand--Restrictions on
hnportation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes, in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS, 37TH SUPP. 200, at 77-81 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1991)
[hereinafter Thai Cigarette Report] (finding that the Thai ban on imported cigarettes
could not be justified under Article XX(g); but failing to consider whether the ciga-
rette ban was a disguised restriction on trade). Other panels have treated the disguised
restriction proviso as merely a transparency requirement.
179. See Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at T 4.18, 5.26 (noting that several
countries disagree on the appropriate application of GATT's art. XX to the tuna ban).
180. CONG. REC. § 3002 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Senator Bentsen);
see Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at 1 4.19 (providing similar views from Japan).
181. Charter for the International Trade Org., U.N. Conference on Trade and Em-
ployment, U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/4 (1948), at Art. 41. The GATT was based on the
draft commercial policy provisions of the ITO Charter.
182. See, e.g., CAROLINE LONDON, ENVIRONMENT ET GATT, ECO-DECISION 37
(1993).
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cle XX(b), however, could reach almost anything which affects the
health of a living organism.' Although there are some environmental
concerns that go beyond life and health, every critical international envi-
ronmental issue would appear to be incorporated."
It is generally agreed that under Article XX(b), GATT members "may
give priority to human health over trade liberalization."'" For instance,
a country might ban the importation of hazardous waste-even though
similar waste is produced domestically-and then claim justification
under Article XX(b) on the grounds that transporting waste over popu-
lated areas is too dangerous. Whether Article XX(b) permits govern-
ments to give priority to animal or plant health over trade liberalization
is somewhat in dispute.
The traditional view is that Article XX(b) applies equally to all living
organisms. It is sometimes argued, however, that an animal has to be
endangered to be covered by Article XX(b).' The text of the Article
XX(b), however, says nothing about endangerment. Further, because
Article XX(b) does not require that humans be endangered before a
trade-related health measure is imposed, it is unclear why a different
requirement pertains to animals.Y
The term "necessary" in Article XX(b) means necessity in a scientific
sense.'" Despite this, in the Dolphin I case, the GAIT Panel an-
nounced that so-called "extrajurisdictional" trade measures were not
"necessary."'' 9 The Panel did not, however, define exactly what it
183. See Michael Prieur, Environmental Regulations and Foreign Trade Aspects, 3
FLA. INT'L L. J., 85, 85-86 (1987) (discussing the broad scope of Article XX).
184. The Canadian government has stated that Article XX embraces "measures to
protect the environment or endangered species." NAFTA WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT..
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA 98 (1993). The European
Commission has stated that "the public policy objectives in XX(b) and (g) are broad
enough to encompass the objectives of environmental protection." EC Proposal on
Trade and Environment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 1992, at S-4.
185. See Thai Cigarette Report, supra note 178, at 1 73 (noting that Art. XX(b)
allowed this preference for any "necessary" measures).
186. See Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at U 3.37, 3.44, 4.29.
187. Mexico apparently recognized this logical difficulty because it argued in the
Dolphin I case that Article XX(b) protected humans, animals and plants "solely as a
population ...and not as separate individuals." Dolphin I Report, supra note 157. at
3.37. But Mexico offered no evidence for this (anti-individual) interpretation which
calls into question the GATT consistency of many trade restrictions relating to animal
or plant disease.
188. U.N. Doc. EIPC/T/A/PV/30 at 8; U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/C.3ISR.35 at 7.
189. See Dolphin I Report, supra note 157. at 1 5.27 (noting that panel based its
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meant by an "extrajurisdictional" trade measure.' 9 One can infer that it
is a trade restriction relating to the life or health of organisms outside
the country imposing the measure. The lack of a clear definition has led
to many uncertainties. For example, it is unclear whether a trade mea-
sure aimed at maintaining global bio-diversity would be considered juris-
dictional or extrajurisdictional."9' While the Dolphin I decision was not
adopted by the GATT Council, virtually every country except the United
States supports it. Nevertheless, the Panel relied upon a distorted reading
of GATT's negotiating history."
Article XX provides exceptions for certain kinds of trade restrictions.
Although an obvious analytic approach was available, the Dolphin I
Panel made no effort to infer the meaning of Article XX(b) and (g)
from the types of environmental trade measures in effect at the time the
GATT was written. 93 Because numerous extrajurisdictional trade mea-
sures were used by many countries, 94 it is quite illogical to suggest
judgment on inferences from the GATT's negotiating history).
190. Some commentators, such as Ted McDorman, take a very broad view of
extraterritoriality to include any law aimed at remedying a situation in another coun-
try. From this perspective, any law linking a benefit to behavior of foreign nationals
is extraterritorial.
191. See Peter L. Lallas et. al., Environmental Protection and International Trade:
Toward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 315
(1992) (commenting that distinctions between jurisdictional and extrajurisdictional inter-
ests and rights become blurred as the effects of activities affecting the global com-
mons are recognized).
192. See Eric Christensen, GATT Sets its Net on Environmental Regulation: The
GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of
the International Trading System, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 569, 583-85
(1991-92) (arguing that the Panel's reliance on the drafting history is misplaced); Ste-
phen J. Porter, The Tuna Dolphin Controversy: Can the GATT Become Environment-
Friendly?, 5 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 91, 102-04 (1992) (noting the drawbacks of
the Panel's interpretation of Article XX); Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures
and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV., 751, 769 (1993) (noting that
the Panel limited its discussion of legislative history to a cursory and selective look
at the UNCTE deliberations, without considering the 1927 Convention); Janet McDon-
ald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in
the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 432-33 (1993) (noting several reasons for
criticizing the Panel's decision on the extraterritorial application of Article XX(b)'s
health and safety exception).
193. For the Mexican Government's arguments see Dolphin I Report, supra note
157, at 3.31, 3.35; see id. at 3.36 (noting that Mexico prohibits the importation
of Dolphins).
194. See Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures 6 GEO.
INT'L ENV. L. REV. 1 (1993) (providing examples of extrajurisdictional environmental
782 [VOL. 9:3
ANALYSIS OF THE PELLY AMENDMENT
that the GATT's authors meant to preclude their coverage under Article
XX. For example, consider the Canada-U.S. treaty of 1937 on the Pres-
ervation of the Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean and Bering
Sea. 95 This treaty empQwered an international fisheries commission to
adopt conservation rules such as limitations on halibut catches and the
character of fishing appliances.' To implement the treaty,'" both
Canada and the United States enacted laws prohibiting the importation
of halibut by vessels of nations not parties to the treaty."t Consistent
with the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination, both
countries also banned the importation of halibut by nationals of either
country if caught in violation of the treaty."9
The authors of GATT could have chosen to restrict the use of such
environmental measures because the purpose of GATT was to discipline
trade restrictions. There is no documentary evidence, however, that the
GATT's authors sought to restrict such extrajurisdictional laws. Con-
versely, the evidence shows the opposite-that the GATT's authors
intended Article XX to provide an exception for existing and future
environmental laws. Interestingly, the U.S. Department of State's analy-
ses of federal laws was inconsistent with the GATT and did not cite
any health or environmental measures.' Because halibut import bans
violated Article XI, they must have been viewed as legal under Article
XX.
To assist in determining whether an environmental provision is neces-
sary under Article XX(b), GATT panels have formulated a broad inter-
trade measures in existence before 1947).
195. 50 Stat. 1351 (1937). This treaty has been superseded by a similar 1953
convention which remains in force. 5 U.S.T.S. 1953.
196. Id. at art. III.
197. See id. at art. IV (noting that the treaty required parties "to enact and en-
force such legislation as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of this
Convention . . .").
198. See Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 169, § 3(b), 50 Stat.
325 (1937) (noting that any person who transfers or receives halibut caught in Con-
vention waters through the use of any vessel of a nation not a party to the Conven-
tion is in violation of the Convention).
199. 1 George VI, ch. 36 §11; Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1937, Pub. L No.
169, 50 Stat. 325 §3(b) (1937).
200. See Trade Agreements Extension Act, 1951: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 82nd Cong., Ist Sess., 1195-99 (1951) (commenting on the escape
clause amendment without mention of health or environmental measures); see also
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Laws Inconsistent with the ITO Charter, (1948) (on
file at The U.S. Department of State's Trade Library).
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pretation of this provision known as the least-GATT-inconsistent require-
ment. Under this requirement, a defendant government must use the
least-GATT-inconsistent alternative it "could reasonably be expected to
employ to achieve its' overriding public policy goals. '03 Such an al-
ternative must be "available" to the government.2"
What is not clear is the range of options a government must consider.
For example, it is sometimes suggested that a government substitute a
product labeling requirement for an environmental or health-related trade
restriction.'03 The GATT Secretariat's report on trade and the environ-
ment raises the question of whether the discrimination in the Basel
Convention and the Montreal Protocol is actually necessary. 4 Certain-
ly, the armchair theorist will always be able to conceive of less-GATT-
inconsistent alternatives that "might" achieve environmental
goals-especially if one is not constrained by practicality.
The Dolphin I Panel opined that "international cooperative arrange-
ments" could be a GATT-consistent approach and, therefore, held that
the alternative of a national arrangement failed the least-GATT-inconsis-
tent test.205 The Panel did not, however completely follow its test. It
offered no analysis as to whether the United States could "reasonably be
expected to employ" such arrangements.2" Nor did it consider whether
such arrangements were "available" to the United States. The Panel
ignored the long history of efforts by the United States, since the mid-
1970s, to attain such international arrangements."° Interestingly, the
201. See Thai Cigarette Report, supra note 178 at 74 (noting that Thailand had
to use the least GATT inconsistent alternative to achieve its principal health objectives
which included the following: protecting the public from harmful ingredients in im-
ported cigarettes, and reducing cigarette consumption in Thailand). In addition, any
inconsistencies with the GATIT must be "unavoidable." Id.
202. Thai Cigarette Report, supra note 178, at 74. It is unclear how a panel
would determine when an alternative is available. Id.
203. Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing
Country Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 330-31 (Patrick
Low ed., World Bank Discussion Papers 159, 1992); see GAIT Doc. C/M/250, at 9
(providing a suggestion from the representative of New Zealand).
204. GAT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Vol. I, at 25 (1990-91).
205. Dolphin I, supra note 157, at 5.28.
206. See Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at 5:28 (noting that the Panel stated
that the United States had failed to demonstrate that it had exhausted this option). It
is interesting to note that under GATT practice, the panel had a responsibility to
"make an objective assessment of the matter before it." BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 265/210 at 16.
207. Ted L. McDorman argues that the Panel did not ignore that point, but con-
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idea of comparing the U.S. marine mammal law to a hypothetical inter-
national agreement originated with the government of Mexico.' This
was a bold argument for Mexico to assert. For years Mexico stone-
walled U.S. attempts to negotiate an international regime to protect
dolphins.
The term "necessary" may soon be interpreted even more narrowly.
In the U.S. Alcoholic Beverages case, a GATT panel found that certain
state laws could not meet the "necessary" test under Article XX(d)
because they were not the "least trade restrictive" enforcement measures
available.2'  Article XX(d) is relevant to the environmental debate be-
cause its case law was used by a previous GATT panel in interpreting
the term "necessary" in Article XX(b). " Thus, the GATT' may be just
one step away from adding a "least trade restrictive" requirement to
Article XX(b). The Uruguay Round Agreement includes a trade-restric-
tiveness requirement for products standards.2"
Returning to the issue of science, it is unclear when a scientific basis
exists for nature protection.2 '2 Even if everyone accepted the goal that
a maximum harvest could be permanently sustained, there may be vari-
ous opinions on what constitutes a maximum harvest." 3 On the one
sidered U.S. efforts immaterial because no other country has ever supported the Unit-
ed States in calling for a dolphin protection treaty. Yet the Panel cannot have it both
ways. It can base its Article XX(b) decision on whether a country first exhausts the
option of attaining an international agreement. The Panel can also base its decision on
whether it thinks the measure is necessary or whether it believes that most GAIT
members think the measure is necessary. The Panel, however, should not shift from
one to the other.
208. See Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at U 3.34, 5.24 (noting Mexico's
claim that it had proposed the formation of an international conference to examine the
interaction of fisheries and the incidental taking of marine mammals).
209. Dispute Settlement Report: United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, in GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, at U
5.41-5.43, 5.52 (June 19, 1992) (discussing the Panel's view that the United States
did not demonstrate that the common carrier requirement was the least trade restric-
tive enforcement measure available to the various states and that less restrictive mea-
sures were not sufficient for tax administration purposes).
210. See Thai Cigarette Report, supra note 178, at 1 74 (discussing why under
Article XX, the meaning of the term "necessary" under paragraph (d) should be the
same as in paragraph (b)).
211. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GAIT Doc. MTN/FA Il-AIA-6.
arts. 2.2 and 2.3 (1993).
212. Thus, the prescient League of Nations report, cited above, is a bit naive in
this respect
213. See William K. Stevens, Biologists Fear Sustainable Yield Is Unsustainable
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hand, because future generations do not participate, there may be a bias
in current judgments toward under-protection."' On the other hand,
both CITES and the IWC require the same super-majorities, two-thirds
and three-fourths respectively, to down-list a species from CITES Ap-
pendix I to Appendix II or to remove species from a whaling quota
schedule. Thus, a species may retain protection longer than "scientifical-
ly" justified.
There is no consensus that a sustainable harvest should be the goal.
There is an increasing aversion, at least in the United States, to the
taking of certain species, such as whales, in any amount. This results, in
part, from skepticism that regulators have enough information to know
when whales are endangered. It also results, however, from a view that
humans should not be predators of whales."5
A preference for banning whaling is no less scientific than a prefer-
ence for the maximum sustainable harvest. Actually neither preference is
"scientific." Both are based on certain values as are all public policy
choices.16 Similarly, some commentators have suggested that a desire
to save all whales or dolphins is not an "environmental" objective, but
rather a moral preference or a value judgment. 17 Certainly, one can
define "environmental" to include species protection and exclude animal
welfare issues; but the notion that protecting animals as a species rests
Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at C4 (noting how scientists who advise fishery
managers have historically calculated a single, unvarying "maximum sustainable
yield"). If the number is calculated on the basis of good ecological conditions for
fish, however, fish stocks will be over-exploited when conditions turn bad. Id.
214. See generally Jon R. Luoma, Listing of Endangered Species Said to Come
Too Late to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at C4. (discussing the U.S. domestic
listing process, which ought to be easier than multilateral listing).
215. See Anthony D.'Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right
to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 62 (1991) (noting that an entitlement to life for
whales is already implicit in international law).
216. See Anne Batchelor, The Preservation of Wildlife Habitat in Ecosystems:
Toward a New Direction Under International Law to Prevent Species' Extinction, 3
FLA. J. INT'L L. 307, 322-26 (1988) (analyzing the justifications for the protection of
global wildlife).
217. See James M. Sheehan, Whales Rock the Trade Boat, J. COM., June 21,
1993, at 6A (arguing that Clinton Administration environmental policies to prevent
Japan and Norway from hunting minke whales lack scientific foundation and are
designed to show environmentalists that President Clinton is more concerned about
environmental issues than previous presidents). But see Genetic Testing Hits at Japa-
nese Whaling, BANGKOK POST, May 21, 1994, at 2 (stating that genetic testing shows
that Japan is selling meat taken from protected species of whale).
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upon science, while protecting animals as individuals rests "only" upon
morals, misses the fundamental point that science does not supply val-
ues.
D. ARTICLE XX(G)
The meaning of Article XX(g) is also unsettled. The scope of Article
XX(g) is potentially as broad as that of Article XX(b).2' Most of the
world's serious environmental issues-such as climate change, disappear-
ing forests, driftnet fishing, waste dumping, and bio-diversity-can be
viewed as natural resources lacking conservation. t9 Although the au-
thors of the GATT saw a clear need for this exception, they wanted to
prevent nations from using it as a restriction on market access or as an
excuse for favoring domestic producers. Thus, to guard against abuse,
the GATT required parallel restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption.'
In the Canada Herring and Salmon case of 1988,2" however, the
GATT Panel declared that an export restriction could qualify under
Article XX(g) only "if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective"
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." The Panel of-
fered no justification for its conclusion that the trade measure had to
facilitate the domestic measure.m Nothing in the legislative history of
218. See Steve Charnovitz, Erploring tie Environmental Erceptions in GATT Arti-
cle XX, J. OF WORLD TRADE, (1991) at 37, 45 (remarking that one may argue that
the drafters intended that Article XX(g) apply only to export restrictions and then
only to exhaustible, as opposed to renewable, natural resources): Dolphin I Report,
supra note 157, at 3.43. Since it began to be invoked in GATT cases in 1982,
however, this provision has been given much broader application. Id.
219. See Partha Dasgupta, The Environment as a Commodity. 6 OXFORD REv.
ECON. POL'Y, 51, 52 (1990) (noting that production of every commodity is related to
a natural resource).
220. See Int'l. Trade Org.: Hearings Before the Comn on Finance, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 135, 412 (1947) (statement of Clair Wilcox) (confirming that countries may
not limit exports unless they also control domestic production and consumption): see
also U.S. Department of State, Background Material on Articles 13-15 and Chapter
IV (Arts. 16-45) of ITO Charter, Mar. 31, 1949, Art. 45, at i. (stating that countries
that restrict exports must also limit domestic use).
221. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Rep.: Canada-AMeasures Affecting Erports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DoCu-
irENTs, 35TH Supp. 114 (GATT Secretariat ed.. 1989).
222. Id.
223. See id. (stating that Article XX(g) must comply with the purposes of the
general agreement).
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Article XX(g) suggests such an interpretation224 and the syntax of Arti-
cle XX(g) refutes the conclusion that any trade measure must augment a
domestic measure.2z
Because the GATT Council adopted this questionable interpretation,
the Dolphin I Panel built upon it to limit Article XX(g) further. In sum,
the Panel's line of reasoning is as follows: under Article XX(g), coun-
tries must aim any trade measure to conserve natural resources-even an
import restriction-primarily at rendering domestic restrictions effective.
Domestic restrictions on production necessarily involve resources under a
country's jurisdiction.226 Therefore, because a trade measure to con-
serve foreign resources cannot facilitate a domestic restriction to con-
serve domestic resources, no "extrajurisdictional" trade measure can
possibly qualify under Article XX(g).
In pursuing this "judicial" activism, the Panel did not consider the
drafting history of this provision which referred to the protection of
wildlife and fisheries through treaties. 27 Because any treaty implies an
international concern, the Panel disregarded the most obvious interpreta-
tion: measures under Article XX(g) were never meant to be applied to
one's own territory.228
A panel could justify its refusal to allow Article XX(g) to protect
natural resources, such as animals living in other countries, on policy
grounds that those governments are responsible. 29 It is difficult, how-
224. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Employment Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., at 18,
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PVI30 (1947) (stating that export bans should be associated with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption); U.N. Conf. on Trade & Employ-
ment Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., at 30, U.N. Doc. E/PCIT/A/PV25 (1947) (assert-
ing that a required link to domestic production or consumption is unrealistic).
225. See McDonald, supra note 192, at 442 (1993) (explaining that the Panel did
not consider the use of the words "production or consumption" in the exceptions
syntax).
226. See McDonald, supra note 192, at 447 (elaborating that the Panel did not ex-
plain how a country might meet this test). The panel disregards the link to domestic
consumption, or non-consumption, of dolphin-unsafe tuna.
227. See Charnovitz, supra note 194, at 45-47 (asserting that environmental laws
and treaties support the view that Article XX is extrajurisdictional).
228. See Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Envi-
ronmental Law, J. OF WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1993, at 43, 69 n. 50 (noting that "It]he
term 'extrajurisdictional application' is misleading in so far as the import restrictions
were applied within the jurisdiction of the United States to products imported into the
United States.").
229. See generally M.J. Bowman, The Protection of Animals Under International
Law, 4 CONN. J. OF INT'L L. 487, 496-99 (1989) (chronicling recent attempts to
protect animals with an international animal welfare instrument).
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ever, to see any justification for not applying Article XX(g) to protect
natural resources in the global commons, such as dolphins living in the
ocean.' If the Dolphin I Panel is correct, then no country can act
unilaterally to safeguard the global commons. Such an anti-environment
stance by the GAIT is neither required, nor even suggested, by the
actual language in Article XX(g). Moreover, no country attempting to
constrict Article XX through interpretation has come forward with any
evidence that GATT's authors intended to disallow import measures
relating to endangered species in foreign countries, let alone the global commons.P'
Although the Dolphin I Panel used different reasoning to conclude
that Article XX(b) and (g) were not extrajurisdictional, one cannot deter-
mine how either mode of analysis squares with other parts of Article
XX, which appear to apply extrajurisdictionally. For example, Article
XX(e) permits trade measures "relating to products of prison labour." At
the time of GATT's inception, many countries banned the importation of
products made with prison labor. ' - The connection between Article
XX(e) and the laws in existence at the time the GATT was written
seems clear. By disallowing extrajurisdictionality in Article XX(b) and
(g), the Panel made no effort to reconcile its interpretation of these
provisions with the health and conservation laws in existence in 1947.
Another interesting provision is Article XX(f), which permits trade
measures "imposed for the protection of natural treasures of artistic,
historic or archaeological value." 3 The laws in existence in 1947 were
apparently restrictions on the export of such treasures.' The exception
as written, however, also would seem to apply to imports." For ex-
230. See John Temple Lang, Some Implications of the Montreal Protocol to the
Ozone Convention, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 183
(Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1992) (asserting that international law must permit states
to take action in the interests of mankind and for the conservation of man's heritage
and God's creation).
231. See Charnovitz, supra note 218. at 52-53 (analyzing GATT"s negotiating
history with respect to the foreign versus domestic environment).
232. See Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards and International Trade, 20 J. WORLD
TRADE, 61, 63 (1986) (remarking that countries such as the United States, Great
Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand observe bans on such products).
233. GATT, supra note 2. art. XX(f).
234. See Paul M. Bator. An Essay on the International Art Trade, 34 STAN. L
REV., 275, 313-14 (1982) (noting that such export restrictions began as early as 1464
A.D.).
235. Cf. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 12, 1930, China-Czech., art. XIII,
110 L.N.T.S. 286, 290 (providing an exception for import and export bans related to
culture and archaeology).
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ample, the United States prohibits the importation of pre-Columbian arti-
facts without a certificate of lawful export.236 If countries cannot use
Article XX(f) to protect foreign artifacts, then the U.S. law would oper-
ate contrary to GATT.7"
A fair reading of Article XX(g) does point to a requirement for paral-
lel restrictions in domestic production or consumption and some link
between the import restriction and the domestic measure. Commentators
have argued that the restricted import must be the same as the product
subject to the domestic restrictions. For example, if the United States
prohibited the consumption of dolphin, then it could ban the importation
of dolphin. Likewise, if the United States prohibited the consumption of
dolphin-unsafe tuna, then it could ban the importation of dolphin-unsafe
tuna, even if it does not prohibit the production or consumption of
dolphin-safe tuna. A U.S. ban on widgets from countries that engage in
dolphin-unsafe practices, however, would seem to run afoul of Article
XX(g), in the absence of some parallel domestic product or process
standard regarding widgets.
In summary, the applicability of Article XX to environmental trade
measures largely depends on whether the Dolphin I decision becomes
GATT law. In relying on its broad interpretation of GATT disciplines,
the Panel warns that if Article XX(b) and (g) were extrajurisdictional,
each importing country could unilaterally determine the environmental
policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate.23 Even
though the Panel had good intentions, its view puts the GATT on a
slippery slope. If the GATT's environmental exceptions can be denied
for dolphin conservation laws, then the next GATT decision might un-
dermine laws aimed at reducing the exploitation of prison labor or safe-
guarding Mayan sculpture. This action would jeopardize the Article XX
"rights" of countries to prohibit certain kinds of traffic.239
236. 19 U.S.C. § 2092(a) (1988) (controlling exports of pre-Columbian art); see 19
U.S.C. § 2606(a) (1988) (requiring State Parties to document the validity of exported
archaeological material).
237. See GATT, supra note 2, art. XII (forbidding import and export restrictions
on contracting parties, other than routine charges).
238. Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at U 5.27, 5.32.
239. WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION
OF WORLD TRADE 415 (1950) (characterizing Article XX as reserved rights).
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For illustrative purposes, let us assume that the United States imposes
a Pelly ban on widgets in response to actions by Country A, a GATT
member, that diminishes the effectiveness of international conservation
efforts such as programs involving whales or tigers. Because widgets are
unrelated to whales, the Pelly ban is a trade sanction.2 Because some
confusion concerning this definition exists, another example may help to
clarify the issue. Consider the U.S. law banning the importation of
shrimp from countries that lack adequate conservation regimes to protect
turtles during shrimp harvesting.24 When countries embargo shrimp to
protect turtles, that action is not a sanction on shrimp because the turtle
killings stem from the shrimp harvesting. If, on the other hand, the
United States embargoed widgets to penalize countries that fail to pro-
tect turtles during shrimp harvesting, that action would constitute a
sanction on widgets.
GATT has never addressed the issue of the GATT-legality of a sanc-
tion because there has never been an environmental trade sanction im-
posed. The Dolphin I Panel did consider a complaint by Mexico regard-
ing the Pelly Amendment, but the Panel issued no decision on that
matter because no Pelly action had occurred.2 2 In the absence of re-
strictions on domestic widget production or consumption, a widget sanc-
tion would probably not qualify under Article XX(g).2"4 This situation
differs from the dolphin-tuna dispute, where the U.S. import ban on tuna
was accompanied by restrictions on domestic harvesting of tuna.2
Unlike Article XX(g), Article XX(b) does not require a parallel do-
mestic provision. 5 Therefore, it may permit sanctions. In determining
240. See Arvind Subramanian, Trade Measures for Environment: A Nearly Empty
Box?, THE WORLD ECON., Jan. 1992, at 135, 139.40 (discussing wvhat constitutes a
trade sanction); see also ZOLLER, supra note 158 at 92-93 (suggesting that the Pelly
amendment is not a true sanction because it aims merely to exercise enough pressure
to prevent a foreign state from jeopardizing specific collective interests).
241. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note.
242. Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at U 5.20, 5.21.
243. See Kazuo Sumi, The 'Whale War' Betveen Japan and the United States:
Problems and Prospects, 17 DENy. J. INT'L LAw & POL'Y, 317, 362 (1989) (stating
that the restriction of imports must be connected to being conserved).
244. See Dolphin I Report, supra note 157, at 7 5.1 (pointing out that the restric-
tions on foreign tuna were not symmetric to the restrictions on domestic tuna).
245. See GAIT, supra note 2, art. XX(b).
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whether Pelly sanctions would meet Article XX(b), one should start with
the headnote and then consider the requirements of the subsection.
First, one must consider if the hypothetical widget sanction qualifies
as a disguised restriction. The Pelly Amendment is clear in this regard.
Nothing in its legislative history suggests a commercial motivation. One
factor that needs consideration, however, is whether the United States
has a large widget industry that the Pelly action might help.
Second, one needs to consider whether the trade sanction is justifi-
able. It is unclear from GATT's drafting history what this condition
means. 46 Perhaps a panel might inquire as to whether the United
States is a party to the Whaling Convention. The U.S. record would
seem acceptable on that point.4 7 In addition, the Panel could ask
whether the United States meets the standard it imposes on other coun-
tries.24 Because there is no indication that U.S. nationals are engaging
in whaling, giving attention to Norway would not constitute a double
standard.249 A panel might also look at the "diminish the effectiveness"
standard imposed by the Pelly Amendment. As noted above, this is a
rather vague test. One question, therefore, is whether it is justifiable to
use a test so vague that other countries cannot reasonably predict the
outcome.
Third, one must consider whether the trade sanction would be arbi-
trary. Here, two issues arise: One is whether the target country is being
singled out arbitrarily. For example, whether it is fair to certify China
but not Yemen. In other words, one must ask whether the conditions
which prevail in China are absent in Yemen. More generally, because
there have been eighteen Pelly cases that resulted without sanction, one
must consider whether the first sanction would be arbitrary compared to
previous cases where no sanction was imposed.
The other issue presents more difficulty-the arbitrariness in the se-
lection of the target product."' One might wonder why widgets are
246. See Charnovitz, supra note 218, at 41 (noting that the International Conven-
tion of 1927 influenced GATT, especially Article XX).
247. See 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988) (requiring that an agreement under Pelly be in
force in the United States).
248. Norway could perhaps argue that eating whales is not as bad as keeping
them in bondage in Sea World.
249. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 916c, 916d, 916i (1988) (prohibiting whaling by U.S. na-
tionals, with minor exceptions).
250. See Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation Promotion: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on
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embargoed rather than trinkets. Certainly, this choice will make a big
difference to the widget producers of Country A. To broaden the point:
Any unrelated product could be viewed as arbitrary simply because it is
unrelated.
Another factor in the adjudication of "arbitrary" would be the extent
of the countermeasures. For commercial retaliation (e.g., Section 301),
the extent of the countermeasures can be matched to the lost exports
because of the foreign trade restriction; but for environmental counter-
measures, there is no obvious benchmark for "making the penalty fit the
crime," or for deterring future actions that undermine an international
agreement. The "value" of Country A's whale trade might seem inappro-
priately low to environmentalists. All trade from Country A, however,
might seem too high to others. Anything in-between might be chal-
lenged as arbitrary.
If trade sanctions are imposed, they could presumably be applied so
long as the target country continued its alleged misbehavior, but not
longer."M In 1989, the GATT Council suggested some guidelines for
the use of Article XX(b), recommending that "[a] measure taken by an
importing contracting party should not be any more severe, and should
not remain in force any longer, than necessary to protect the human,
animal or plant life or health involved, as provided in Article
XX(b).' ' 2
When countervailing or antidumping duties are imposed under GATT
Article VI, they must be withdrawn as soon as the dumping or subsidiz-
ing ceases. These duties are not meant to punish, but rather to offset
certain advantages. 3 The GATT does allow the Contracting Parties,
acting jointly, to authorize trade retaliation "as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances."' This retaliation, however, has been
authorized only once in the history of the GATF."
Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1989) (statement of the Japan Fisheries
Assoc.) (noting that arbitrary restrictions of imports would swallow the rule if per-
mitted).
251. See Elisabeth Zoller, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERmEASURES 75 (1984) (explaining that counter-measures are temporary in
nature).
252. GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTs. 365/367.
253. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 167-79 (1970) (discussing the purpose and use of both
countervailing and antidumping duties).
254. GAIT, supra note 2, art. XXIII. § 2.
255. DAM, supra note 253, at 260. The Netherlands never carried out the retalia-
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If two nations are "pellyed" at the same time for the same rea-
son-for example, China and Taiwan-it may be difficult to make the
countermeasures non-arbitrary. Taiwan may view banning an equal
amount of trade from each country as unfair because China is much
bigger. Calibrating a trade ban relative to gross domestic product or to
total exports, however, could be attacked by one or both of these
countries as arbitrary. Moreover, if China and Taiwan are pellyed for
the same reason, and the United States Government embargoes widgets
from one and trinkets from the other, then both countries could allege
discrimination. 6 In other words, widgets from China and widgets
from Taiwan would be treated differently even though the same con-
ditions prevail in both countries (i.e., the Pelly violation). Another issue
is whether the government's administrative capacity should be taken into
account in calibrating countermeasures. For example, the Clinton admin-
istration seemed to have expected more from Taiwan than from China.
A final issue is whether a country whose government may be complicit
(i.e., China) should draw a more stern penalty than a country where the
violations occur in the private sector. As it turned out, the opposite may
have occurred. Taiwan was at a disadvantage because its right of private
property slowed down action by its government to confiscate and de-
stroy specimens.
The two tracks of the Pelly Amendment have led to the proposition
that embargoing fish products for fishery violations and wildlife products
for wildlife violations would have a stronger GATT justification than
embargoing widgets. There is no merit to that argument, however, be-
cause a product is either implicated or it is not. Had the Bush adminis-
tration imposed countermeasures against Japan on sea turtles, 7 it
would not seem relevant for the purposes of GATT Article XX whether
the target was stereos or sturgeon.
The specified countermeasure under Pelly is an import ban.258 This
tion.
256. Because neither country is a GAT1' member, the complaint is hypothetical.
257. See generally John Lancaster, Endangered Sea Turtle Seen Jeopardized by
Japan; U.S. Agencies Study Scientists' Recommendations that Could Result in Trade
Sanctions, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1991, at A3 (reporting on the U.S. threat of trade
sanctions against Japan).
258. See Pelly Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (amending
68 Stat. 883 (1954)) (authorizing the president to take measures to prohibit U.S. im-
ports of fish products from the offending country); Tom Kenworthy, U.S. Pressures
China, Taiwan on Anhnal Trade, WASH. POST, June 10, 1993, at A28 (suggesting that
the president, under the Pelly Amendment, may prohibit all imports from an offending
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differs from the environmental sanction provided for in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962: a tariff increase."' Such tariff increases would
violate the GATT.2 ' Nevertheless, governments on both ends may pre-
fer tariffs to import bans because tariffs, at least at low levels, tend to
be less disruptive." From an environmental perspective, this virtue is
a bane. Low penalty tariffs may not change foreign behavior because
commerce adjusts too easily to them.
The purpose of a law like the Pelly Amendment is to send a message
to other countries that the United States wants them to take international
conservation issues seriously.2' If a tariff is used as an environmental
countermeasure, the country being targeted may misperceive the measure
as simply disguised protectionism. By using an import ban, Pelly has a
potential of sending a clearer signal to other countries about U.S. mo-
tives. Nevertheless, much of Pelly's impact depends on the target prod-
ucts. Certainly, the president must select a product that the United States
imports; it would not signal seriousness to other countries by banning a
product that the United States does not import. If the president selects
an import that competes with U.S. domestic production, however, his
actions could look like protectionism. Thus, the ideal target product is
something which is not produced in the United States and may be im-
ported from other countries that are not rendering environmental treaties
less effective.
With regard to the "necessary" requirement in subsection (b), a panel
might ask whether a measure has to be efficacious to be necessary.263
For example, one might ask whether a trade sanction against Country A
country).
259. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-794. 76 Stat. 872. § 201
(1962) (providing that the president may impose import restrictions on a foreign coun-
try that hinders U.S. trade).
260. Increasing any bound tariff generally violates GATT Article I1. Increasing a
tariff on a particular country violates GATT Article I.
261. A prohibitive tariff (e.g.. 200% ad valorem) would seem equivalent to an
import ban. See 19 U.S.C. § 1323 (1962) (limiting tariff increases to no more than
50% above the rates existing in 1934).
262. See Tom Kenworthy, China and Taiwan Warned on Endangered Species.
WASH. PosT, Sept. 8, 1993, at A21 (reporting that the Interior Secretary's threat of
Pelly Amendment trade sanctions against China and Taiwan intended to warn other
countries about the unlawfulness of trade in wildlife products).
263. Charles S. Pearson and Robert Repetto, Reconciling Trade and Environment:
The Next Steps, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE, REPORT TO EPA FROm
NACEPT 100 (McAlpine et al. eds., 1993); Dolphin I Report, supra note 157. at 1
5.28.
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would actually save whales, or whether Country A would continue
whale hunting regardless of the sanction. It would seem illogical, how-
ever, to make the illegality of sanctions under GATT depend on the
obduracy of the country violating the spirit, if not the letter, of an in-
ternational environmental treaty. Moreover, this approach seems to inval-
idate sanctions against large countries that could resist such pressure.
The least-GATT-inconsistent test could also present an obstacle to the
use of Article XX(b). A panel might suggest the use of a financial
inducement instead of a trade penalty. If a treaty has dispute settlement
mechanisms, a panel might suggest that they be used first before resort-
ing to unilateral measures. Because the IWC lacks such mechanisms,
this consideration should not be a hurdle for a Pelly action related to
that treaty. On the other hand, CITES provides that disputes can be re-
ferred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration by mutual consent of the
parties. Thus, a panel might suggest that the country levying Pelly sanc-
tions first make an offer to go to arbitration.
The Panel might also take into account the irreversibility of species
loss in determining the necessity of a sanction. Because the CITES trade
ban has not succeeded in protecting the rhino, rapid actions are needed
if the rhino is to be saved.264 Thus, although GATT panels might pre-
fer that the least-GATT-inconsistent approach be used, a panel might
defer to the solution chosen by a government given the time-sensitivity
involved. On the other hand, GATT panels may not want to treat emer-
gencies differently than normal trade rules because that could encourage
other countries to use trade sanctions to prevent species extinction. If
the GATT were to adopt the Precautionary Principle, panels would have
a basis for making this kind of judgment.
F. DIFFERENT JUSTIFICATIONS
The analysis so far presumes that a panel reviewing a Pelly sanction
would follow the existing GATT precedents. A GATT Panel, however,
is not actually bound by precedent. It is, practically speaking, free to
devise an entirely new line of reasoning to justify or oppugn an envi-
ronmental trade sanction.26
264. Save the Rhino, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 20.
265. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Con-
gruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv., 1227, 1273 (1992) (noting that there
is no official policy of stare decisis in international law). A GATT Panel report is
not binding for future cases. Id.
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Consider a situation where an international environmental agreement
requires or calls upon its parties to impose a trade sanction against
Country A.' Although Country A, assuming it is a GAIT member,
has a right under GATT not to be discriminated against,' the GATT
Panel might overlook this right in deference to an erga omnes3 trea-
ty. For whales, the IWC has not called for any trade sanctions;"0
but for rhinos and tigers, the CITES Standing Committee has unani-
mously called upon its parties to "consider" implementing import prohi-
bitions against wildlife products from China and Taiwan."' Thus, a
GATT panel might characterize a trade sanction targeting wildlife prod-
ucts as GA1T-consistent due to the multilateral support for such action.
This rationale, however, could not apply to a trade sanction targeting
non-wildlife products.
Alternatively, the GATT might consider whether the trade of wildlife
products violates an international conservation regulation. For example,
if Country A imports rhino horn in contradiction to CITES, the Panel
might deem a countermeasure against A not inconsistent with the
GATT. In 1971, the U.S. Department of State told a congressional com-
mittee, during the drafting of the Pelly Amendment, that trade sanctions
266. This example presumes that Country A is not a party to the environmental
agreement. If Country A is a party to the agreement, it would be subject to retalia-
tion. Consequently, the treaty might supersede country A's rights under the GATr.
267. GAIT, supra note 2, art. I.
268. See Oscar Schacter, General Course in Public International Law, in 5
RECUEaL DES COURS 199 (Academie de Droit International ed., 1982) (stating that the
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment has been treated as an erga
omnes obligation by the International Law Commission).
269. In the GATT case, EEC-Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong, the European Community stated:
Recent GATT experience had revealed a whole series of actions and measures
that were not directly covered by the provisions of the General Agreement in
the strict sense, and which had perhaps not been envisaged by its authors' . . .
the Panel could not ignore that the General Agreement was an international
agreement which had to be interpreted on the basis of generally accepted prin-
ciples and practices of international law.
GAiT, BAsIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 30S/129, at 15. The Panel
acknowledged that the principle of "law-creating force in the absence of law" could
be relevant to the GATT. Id. at 29.
270. The IWC has requested parties to refrain from importing whale products from
non-members, but no sanctions have been suggested. IWC Resolution, App. 7 (1978).
271. Rhinoceros and Tiger: Time For a Decision. CITES PRESS RELEASE. Sept. 9.
1993. One wonders whether the author of the press release is thinking about a deci-
sion in Beijing or Washington.
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against nations breaching international conservation regulations would
not violate GATT obligations.272
From a GATT-only perspective, it is difficult to defend these poten-
tial new interpretations.273 There is nothing in Article I or Article XX
which suggests that discrimination is more acceptable based on a multi-
national standard than a national one.274 Thus, it would seem difficult
for the GATT to yield to CITES. It is interesting to note, however, that
the GATT does explicitly yield to the International Monetary Fund
findings in support of import restrictions to safeguard a country's bal-
ance of payments. 5
The European Union (EU) has suggested that the issue of
extrajurisdictionality "is of no relevance in those cases in which the
international community has agreed on the need to take action to ad-
dress an environmental problem of common concern." '276 Leaving aside
the practical problem of knowing when the "international community,"
has made such a determination,277 the implication of this suggestion is
that in reading multilateral treaties into Article XX, the EU favors read-
ing out unilateral extrajurisdictional environmental measures.278 Given
272. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 11-12 (1971) (letter
from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State, in Commercial Fisheries).
273. Although defendant countries have occasionally raised other treaty obligations
in defense of their disputed measures, GATT panels have avoided consideration of
other treaties. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 37S/86, at
154.
274. Charnovitz, supra note 218, at 54; see RICHARD EGLIN, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE-GENUINE CONCERN OR DISGUISED PROTEC-
TIONISM 8 (1992) (stating that the same arguments apply to trade measures in treaties
designed to penalize countries as apply to the use by one country of measures to
influence the environmental policies of another).
275. GATT, supra note 2, art. XII, § 1, § 2; art. XV, § 2; art. XVIII, § 9.
276. See EC Proposal on Trade and Environment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27,
1992, at S-4.
277. Aside from the existence of a treaty (or perhaps "soft law" like U.N. Resolu-
tion), it is not easy to infer when the international community has agreed to take
action. The international consensus on whales, however, has an opt-out clause which
Norway now invokes. If the contemporary international community does not think that
such an opt-out clause is appropriate, then it should amend the treaty or write a new
one. It is incorrect, however, to cite the Whaling Convention as creating a norm that
Norway violates.
278. EC Proposal on Trade and Environment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 1992,
at S-3 (stating that the basic rule according to which a country should not unilaterally
restrict imports on the basis of environmental damage that does not impact on a
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the difficulty of achieving multilateral agreements even when
unilateralism plays a supportive role, there could be considerable danger
for the environment in the EU's suggestions for a multilateral-only ap-
proach.
Because CITES does not require trade sanctions against violators,
there is no way that it could supersede GATT as a more recent treaty.
One possible argument is that because CITES authorizes trade sanctions,
it clashes with the GATT. Consequently, a panel might choose CITES
over GATT because the former is a more recent, or more relevant,
treaty. Despite commentary to the contrary, however, CITES does not
authorize trade sanctions. What CITES provides is that the treaty "in no
way affect[s] the right of Parties to adopt . . . domestic measures re-
stricting or prohibiting trade of species not included" in a CITES Ap-
pendix.279 The purpose of this provision was to make clear that CITES
did not preclude the protection of a species not on a CITES list. It was
not meant to authorize unilateral or multilateral action against those who
disregard treaties.
Nevertheless, the CITES Conference has advocated action against
nations that do not follow the treaty.' For example, the CITES Con-
ference recommended in 1987 that Parties, "use all appropriate means
(including economic, political and diplomatic) to exert pressure on coun-
tries continuing to allow trade in rhinoceros horn."'" It is unclear
where the authority for this lies. Perhaps it is the provision in CITES
that empowers the Conference of the Parties to "make whatever recom-
mendations it deems appropriate" after reviewing a situation where the
provisions of the treaty "are not being effectively implemented."' Be-
cause CITES does not require parties to adhere to such recommenda-
country's territory needs to be upheld). The EU, however, does not practice what it
preaches. For example, it has enacted a ban on fur caught in countries that permit
leg-hold traps. European Council Regulation, 3254/91 (1308/1).
279. CITES, supra note 130, art. XIV, § l(b). Nevertheless, the CITES Conference
of the Parties relies upon this provision to encourage trade restrictions on non-CITES
wildlife products by non-complying countries. If a country used this provision to ban
all fish imports from a country, that would be a sanction.
280. See Hamilton Southworth II, GATT and the Environment, 32 VA. J. INT'L L
997, 1011-13 (discussing the need for limited coercive trade measures to enforce
multilateral environmental treaties); David Favre, Debate Within the CITES Commu-
nity: What Direcion For the Future?, 33 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 875, 911 (1993)
(describing the new CITES practice).
281. CITES Conference, Res. 6.10 (1987).
282. CITES, supra note 130, art. XIII.
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tions by the CITES Conference, there is a questionable basis for a
GATT panel to overlook a basic GATT rule like MFN.283
The same countries that are members of CITES and approve recom-
mendations calling for trade sanctions are the same countries that are
members of the GATT and regularly denounce U.S. environmental trade
measures, even the non-sanctions, as being GATT-inconsistent. The
explanation for this apparent paradox is that trade ministries are repre-
sented at the GATT while wildlife management agencies are represented
at CITES. Accordingly, officials from the same country can and do take
contradictory positions in the two organizations. This ability to assume
contradictory positions points to the wisdom of the OECD in getting
Trade and Environment Committees to work jointly on this issue since
1991.
The Pelly Amendment is not limited to CITES and the IWC. It ap-
plies to any international program for fishery conservation or for endan-
gered or threatened species. Some of these other treaties might present
better cases for GATT consistency. For example, consider a hypothetical
Pelly sanction related to the Convention for the Conservation of
Anadromous Fishing Stocks.2" This Convention directs parties to take:
"appropriate measures, individually and collectively, in accordance with
international law and their respective domestic laws, to prevent traffick-
ing in anadromous fish taken in violation of the prohibitions provided
for in this Convention .... ."' This provision might supersede the
GATT as a more recent or specific treaty. A party pellyed under this
provision, however, could argue that this treaty does not refer to trade
sanctions because the sanctions are not GATT-consistent, and therefore
are not consistent with international law. Another option for transcending
the GATT would be where a country has violated an environmental
treaty. A panel might find that unilateral countermeasures are permitted
under the principles of international law as long as they are not dispro-
283. Cf. Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade--A Multilateral Impera-
tive, 1 MINN. J. OF GLOBAL TRADE, 231, 247 (1992) (suggesting that the GATT
itself is a multilateral agreement and that by definition other multilateral agreements
may be permissible under GATT despite the fact that they violate GATT's tenet of
nondiscrimination).
284. S. Treaty Doc. No. 30, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1991). A similar argument
could be made with respect to the Wellington Convention for the Prohibition of Fish-
ing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific. Convention for the Prohibition of Fish-
ing With Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, arts. 3(l)(b), 3(3), Nov. 24, 1989, 29
I.L.M. 1453, 1457.
285. S. Treaty Doc. No. 30, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. art. 3.3 (1991).
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portionate to the violation and injury suffered.' Following this ap-
proach, there would be a need to show injury. At issue is what injury
the United States has suffered from Norwegian whaling or Chinese trade
in rhino horn. There might be an injury if a rhino species became ex-
tinct, although the injury to the United States would be the same as the
injury to every country. At this point a Pelly sanction would be too late
to help.
One difficulty with the "violation-based" approach is that it is not
clear when a country has violated an environmental treaty. A GATT
panel would presumably want to defer to the judgment of the CITES or
IWC parties on this point. Unfortunately, neither treaty organization has
a judicial mechanism for making such findings.
Because Norway has taken a reservation on the minke whale, it is not
violating the Whaling Convention.' Norway also could have been
pellyed on the wildlife track for diminishing the effectiveness of
CITES." s Norway is engaging in coastal whaling, however, and there-
fore it is not violating CITES.' Norway is neither importing whales
nor introducing them from the sea. Considering the migratory nature of
whales, one can argue that Norway is diminishing the effectiveness of
CITES and the IWC by not joining in whale conservation.'
Taiwan, not a member of CITES, cannot violate a treaty obligation.
Given Taiwan's ineligibility for membership in CITES, there would be a
question as to whether an Article XX sanction was justifiable. Because
Taiwan has no role in setting CITES standards, it is problematic for the
United States to insist that Taiwan honor them.2'
China may be in violation of CITES. They argue, however, that their
rhino horn is pre-Convention. This may be a dubious claim, but one
286. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 905(a) (1980) Vol. 2, § 905(a); see GAIT SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO GATT LAw
AND PRACTICE 670 (1994) (citing the general international law applicable to a Ger-
many-Iceland dispute).
287. Milton M.R. Freeman, U.S. Goes Overboard on the Whales, THE PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Aug. 9, 1993, at A19.
288. See Cynthia T. Bright, Comment, The Future of the International Whaling
Commission: Can We Save the Whales?. 5 GEO. INT'L ENvTL L REv., 815, 843-45
(1993) (discussing the intersection of CITES and the Whaling Convention).
289. DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES 89 (1989).
290. Iceland also diminished the effectiveness of the IPVC by resigning. Pelly is
based, however, on action by nationals, not on government policy.
291. CITES gives Taiwan the same rights to attend meetings as it gives to non-
governmental organizations.
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may question who is to judge. The CITES Standing Committee has
pointed a finger at China, but it has not really convicted China of being
in violation of CITES. The United States Government might consider
China a treaty violator; but China does not get a hearing on the matter
because the Pelly Amendment does not require administrative hearings
for China.
Another road a panel might take is to acknowledge the GATT viola-
tion, but to state that the trade regime must yield to the environment
regime."' Berlin and Lang recently suggested that "GATT should al-
most always give way to international environmental agreements be-
cause, compared to the GATT, these environmental provisions are...
most of all, more popular." '293 Whether such a "more popular" rule will
supplement the "more recent treaty" rule of international law remains to
be seen.
G. AUTHORITY TO USE PELLY
If the Pelly Amendment violates the GATT, there are grounds for
questioning the authority of the president to impose Pelly sanctions.
Because GATT is an international agreement, the president has an obli-
gation to follow GATT rules.294 Under the U.S. Constitution, a more
recent law trumps a treaty obligation in the event of an inconsistency.
The Pelly Amendment of 1971, revised in 1992, is far more recent than
the GATT of 1947, revised in 1965. Because Pelly is completely discre-
tionary, however, trumping may not occur. Thus, one could argue that
because the executive has discretion in applying Pelly sanctions, the
president should yield to the GATT, which is an executive agree-
ment. 5
292. In the rhino and tiger case, there are actually conflicting environmental re-
gimes. The Chinese want these products for medicinal purposes. See Eugene Linden,
Tigers on the Brink, TIME, March 28, 1994, at 44, 47 (commenting that affluent Tai-
wanese with flagging libidos pay as much as $320 for a bowl of tiger soup to en-
hance their sexual prowess). One may question how the GAIT could place a value
on rhino health in relation to human health of Chinese citizens. In other words, one
wonders how the GATT decides whether Chinese folk medicine is more scientifically
valid than judgments of a CITES committee.
293. Kenneth Berlin and Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, 16 THE
WASH. Q., vol. 4 at 48 (1993).
294. GATT, supra note 2.
295. Cf. Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. U.S., 966 F.2d 660, 661
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the GATT does not trump domestic legislation). If
statutory provisions are inconsistent with the GATT, it is matter for Congress, not the
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This view is further bolstered by the unusual language in the Pelly
Amendment which appears to condition the president's countermeasure
authority "to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned by the Gener-
al Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."' There are three ways to view
this provision: the president can use Pelly only if the GATT approves;
the president can use Pelly only if he thinks it GAIT-legal; or the pres-
ident can use Pelly unless the GATT contracting parties disapprove. No
U.S. president has ever taken the first view. In congressional testimony
in 1990, an official from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
seemed to take the third view. - If a GAIT panel ruled against the
United States on Pelly, and if this were adopted by the GAIT Council,
then future use of Pelly could be foreclosed under this third view. The
first use of Pelly sanctions also could be the last.
The recent statements by the Clinton Administration that it will seek
Senate approval for U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS)298 raise a new issue regarding trade sanctions
under the Pelly Amendment. According to one recent commentator,
Professor Richard J. McLaughlin, "The United States may have to
relinquish its use of unilateral economic sanctions as a method of pro-
tecting dolphins, sea turtles, and whales if it chooses to become a party
to UNCLOS .... "' In exclusive economic zones, UNCLOS gives
coastal states jurisdiction over marine conservation policies (e.g. whal-
ing).' On the high seas, UNCLOS may be read as suggesting that
conservation measures must be multilateral."' UNCLOS also states that
conservation measures "shall not discriminate in form or in fact against
the fisherman of any State."3 '
court, to decide and remedy. lt
296. 21 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1988).
297. Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation Promotion, H.R. SERIAL NO. 60, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1990) (statement of Leonard W. Condon).
298. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
299. Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use
of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International
Marine Living Resources, in 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 5 (1994).
300. See id. at 31-32 (noting that UNCLOS gives coastal states broad discretion to
weigh scientific evidence); UNCLOS, supra note 298, art. 56.1, 61.1.
301. See id. at 34-38 (stating that international agreement is required before states
can prescribe conservation measures for the high seas).
302. UNCLOS, supra note 298, art. 119.3. While UNCLOS governs the national
regulation of fisheries, it is unclear whether UNCLOS also governs the use of trade
restrictions.
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If a dispute arises about a U.S. trade sanction, the affected nation can
invoke the compulsory dispute settlement procedure of UNCLOS.3 3
Decisions under this procedure are final.3° Parties have an obligation
to comply with them.35 Thus, even if a GATT panel concludes that an
environmental trade measure fits under Article XX, an UNCLOS tribu-
nal may rule that the measure violates UNCLOS.
None of this applies to the United States at this time since it is not a
party to UNCLOS. If, however, the United States were to become a
party, the president might have an obligation to cease using (or threaten-
ing) his discretionary powers under the Pelly amendment.3" This obli-
gation would be more compelling if U.S. ratification of UNCLOS is
more recent than the Pelly amendment (or changes to it). If UNCLOS
had gone into force earlier (and assuming the United States were a party
to it), all of the Pelly certifications discussed above, except rhinos and
tigers, might have been foreclosed.
The potential relationship between UNCLOS and the Pelly amendment
will undoubtedly be considered by the U.S. Senate. According to
McLaughlin, "Support among some members of the executive branch for
U.S. membership in UNCLOS may take on added urgency if they be-
lieve it may stop or slow the environmental matters.' 3" The possibili-
ties for using UNCLOS to tame the United States may be one factor in
the recent rush of nations to accede to the treaty. As McLaughlin notes,
"Many foreign nations will be inclined to support any institutional
mechanism that prevent the United States from imposing unilateral eco-
",308nomic trade sanctions ....
303. UNCLOS, supra note 298, part XV.
304. UNCLOS, supra note 298, arts 296. UNCLOS Article 282 provides that
UNCLOS will defer to dispute settlement procedures in other agreements if they
entail a binding decision. McLaughlin argues that current GATI' procedures are not
binding. See McLaughlin, supra note 299, at 59-60. It is unclear whether the revi-
sions in the Uruguay Round will render these procedures binding for purposes of
Article 282.
305. It is unclear whether there would be a private right of action to enforce such
a judgement in U.S. courts. If the United States ratifies the treaty, the implementing
legislation might clarify this point.
306. RESTATEMENT, supra note 286, § 115 comment C. The treaty would super-
sede the Pelly amendment if self-executing but UNCLOS will need implementing
legislation. That could clarify the status of Pelly. Certainly, ratification of UNCLOS
would give the President an excuse not to invoke Pelly sanctions.
307. See McLaughlin, supra note 299, at 75.
308. See McLaughlin, supra note 299, at 76.
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CONCLUSION
The trade and environment debate is often framed as a choice be-
tween unilateralism and multilateralism. One reason that so little prog-
ress has been made over the past few years is that this dichotomy is a
faulty specification of real alternatives. For many environmental prob-
lems, such as saving whales or the ozone layer, the only workable solu-
tions are multilateral ones. Yet workability does not assure the political
feasibility of a potential solution.
No one who favors the solution of international environmental prob-
lems opposes multilateralism. No one writing about the trade and envi-
ronment conflict has advocated unilateral measures as the first resort or
the first-best option. The problem facing the world, however, is what to
do if the multilateral approach fails to achieve a desirable agreement.
One view is that environmental proponents should just continue using
reasoned persuasion. It would also be acceptable for a nation preferring
greater whale protection to provide financial compensation to nations
with different preferences. From this absolutist perspective, nations
should not pressure each other.' Only purely consensual actions are
legitimate.
Another view is that actions speak louder than words and sometimes
non-consensual actions are needed."' From this perspective, a mix of
carrots and sticks is likely to be more effective than just carrots. Negoti-
ators who have only carrots at their disposal will soon run out of car-
rots.
The problem with a multilateral-only rule is that it defaults to inac-
tion.3"' While national governments have rules that require the minority
to adhere to the decision of the majority, no such rule obtains at the
supranational level. It is easy to support multilateralism as an ideal."'
309. See generally William C. Clark, Environmental Imperialism, in 35 E'VIRO.N-
,IENT 1 (1991) (discussing repercussions of nationalistic environmental pressures).
310. The author recognizes that this answer is not the same for all countries.
Some countries, particularly small ones, may not be in a position to offer carrots or
threaten sticks.
311. See Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv., 1373, 1380-81 (1992) (discussing implications of non-
availability of environmental trade sanctions).
312. See Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From
the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329, 1351-61 (1992) (arguing
against the use of unilateral trade measures).
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One wonders, however, how many Americans would want the U.N.
General Assembly to decide whether the United States could use the
Pelly Amendment. For that matter, one wonders how many Norwegians
would want the General Assembly to decide whether Norway could
resume commercial whaling.
There is a wide divergence of views on the efficacy of a unilateral
environmental trade measure." 3 Some commentators state that it can
encourage cooperation and improve the environment, while others pre-
dict it can lead only to disunity.
This Article looked at one program, the Pelly Amendment, from the
perspective of one country. Nevertheless, after nineteen years of opera-
tion, there is now sufficient data to begin to formulate some tentative
conclusions. This analysis shows that the Pelly Amendment has been
reasonably effective in increasing adherence to certain international con-
servation standards. As with any trade sanction, there is always a ques-
tion as to whether past experience can continue in the future or be
replicated in other countries.
This Article also considered whether environmental trade sanctions are
consistent with the GATT. This is different from, but not unrelated to,
the efficacy of such sanctions. If environmental trade sanctions contrib-
uted to a deterioration of the international trade system, that could have
negative consequences. Conversely, the conventional wisdom that Pelly
sanctions are GATT-illegal may increase the resistance of the country
being pellyed. As one commentator has noted: "[m]ultilateral environ-
mental agreements will be greatly weakened if signatories are unable to
use trade measures to protect against free riders, and the [Dolphin I]
Panel decision increases the incentive for nations to free ride." '314
Because the interpretation of GATT Article XX3 s is in flux, the sta-
tus of the Pelly Amendment remains unclear. This Article showed many
ways in which the use of the Pelly Amendment could violate the
GATT. This Article also showed, however, that a well-crafted Pelly
action could perhaps fit under the Article XX(b) exception. In offering
this analysis, whether a GATT panel is likely to affirm Pelly's legality
313. See Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce Interna-
tional Whaling Agreements: A Critical Perspective, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
317 (1989) (stating that unilateral actions are of either limited utility or create diplo-
matic friction); Martin Jr. and Brennan, supra note 37, at 315 (asserting that the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments have unquestionably had salutary effect).
314. David J. Ross, Making GATT Dolphin Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L., 345, 366 (1992).
315. GATT, supra note 2.
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under the GATIT remains undetermined. In all likelihood, a GAIT panel
would condemn a Pelly action by the United States. The mind-your-
own-environment attitude is very strong in GAT" today. '16
In 1937, countries approving the Whaling Convention were confronted
with the problem of what to do if enough nations did not join the new
whaling controls. The Final Act noted:
[tihe Conference recognises [sic] that the purpose of the present Agree-
ment may be defeated by the development of unregulated whaling by
other countries, in which case it would be a matter for consideration
whether the present Agreement should be continued in force, or whether
the contracting Governments should ... permit their nationals to pursue
whaling without regulation, so that they may derive from its pursuit such
benefit as may be had before the stock of whales has been re-
duced .... 317
These countries saw a stark dilemma--either attain sufficient cooperation
or consider abandoning the new regulations.
Statesmen do not need to accept this dilemma stoically. They can
resort to a third alternative by using economic pressure, such as the
Pelly Amendment, on non-cooperating nations."' These sanctions will
be consistent with GATT rules if undertaken in a non-protectionist man-
ner. Indeed, they may be consistent with an even higher law assigning
mankind a special responsibility to protect the creatures who inhabit the
Earth.
316. See Steve Chamovitz, GATT and the Environment: Eramining the Issues. 4
INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 203 (1992) (commenting on the GATT' Secretariat report).
317. Agreement for Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 1937, 52 Stat. 1460. 1469
(1937).
318. See Linden, supra note 292, at 44, 51 (stating that the Pelly amendment has
the potential to become the world's most powerful piece of environmental legislation).
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